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DODD-FRANK'S SAY ON PAY: WILL IT LEAD TO A
GREATER ROLE FOR SHAREHOLDERS IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
Randall S. Thomast Alan R. Palmitertt &James F. Cottertt

"Say on pay" gives shareholders an advisory vote on a company's pay
practicesfor its top executives. Beginning in 2011, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) mandated such
votes at public companies. The first year of say on pay under the new legislation reflects a change in the dialogue and give-and-take in the shareholder-management relationship,particularly on the question of executive
pay.
We study the evolution of shareholdervoting on say on pay-beginning
in 2006 as a fledgling shareholdermovement to get say on pay on the corporate ballot; then evolving with a handful of companies and later the financialfirms conducting say-on-pay votes as they received Troubled Assets Relief
Program (TARP) funds; and finally leading to Dodd-Frank's extension of
the process to all public companies.
Using results from an empirical analysis of data from the pre-DoddFrankperiod, we project that the new mandatory management-sponsoredsayon-pay proposals will attract strong shareholder support at most companies,
while poorly performing companies with high pay levels can expect shareholder dissent. Early results in the first yearpost-Dodd-Frank confirm these
projections.
Our empirical analysis of the pre-Dodd-Frankdata supports the potential importance of third-party voting advisory recommendations-particularly those by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)-on executive pay
proposals. The raw data show a 20 % swing in shareholder support for
management say-on-pay proposals associatedwith a negative ISS recommendation. However, once we take into account the different recommendations
issued by management and ISS, the net effect of a negative ISS recommendation on the overall shareholder vote is relatively small at most companies.
Nevertheless, the early Dodd-Frank results show that all thirty-seven companies that failed to obtain majority support in these advisory votes had received negative ISS recommendations.
The early results also show that companies that initially received negative say-on-pay recommendationsby ISS often modified their disclosurefilings
t John S. Beasley II Chair in Law and Business, Vanderbilt Law School, Professor of
Management, Owen School of Business, Vanderbilt University.
tt Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
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or changed their pay practices. This may indicate a growing role for shareholders in influencing executive pay practicesand corporategovernance more
generally.
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INTRODUCTION

For the past twenty years, executive pay in U.S. public companies
has been controversial. 1 Some say it's too high and is set by captured
boards. 2 Some say it reflects the marketplace in action. 3 Some say it
creates perverse (even dangerous) incentives. 4 Some say it is being
reformed and increasingly rewards the right things. 5
With Dodd-Frank, shareholders of U.S. public corporations now
also have their say. The Act mandates that public shareholders have
an advisory vote on the prior year's compensation of the corporation's
top five executives-a "say on pay." Looking at shareholder voting on
executive pay at public companies in the eight proxy seasons preceding the enactment of Dodd-Frank, this Article asks whether the new
mandatory say-on-pay regime will change executive pay levels and
practices, and more generally, the dialogue between management and
shareholders on the subject.
We first review the background of the debate over say on pay, as
well as the enactment of the statute. We then examine shareholder
votes before the enactment of Dodd-Frank on seven categories of
precatory executive pay proposals submitted by shareholders under
Rule 14a-8, including shareholder proposals recommending company-by-company adoption of say on pay. We find that, amongst all of
these shareholder proposals, proposals requesting that shareholders
approve certain pay practices, other than the overall pay levels, and
proposals seeking a shareholder say on pay are the highest vote getters
by a wide margin. We interpret this finding to indicate that a strong
shareholder interest in providing an advisory vote on executive pay
existed before the adoption of the Dodd-Frank requirements.
Continuing to examine the pre-Dodd-Frank data, we then look
at how shareholders voted on shareholder proposals for say on pay
1

See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY (Randall S. Thomas &Jennifer

G. Hill eds., forthcoming 2012) (containing a recent compilation of articles by finance,
accounting, and law professors on the topic).
2

LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:

THE UNFULFILLED

PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 30-33, 70-71 (2004).
3
See generallyJohn E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compen-

sation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (reviewing
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2) (critiquing Bebchuk and Fried's argument that executive
compensation contracts are suboptimal if they reflect managerial power).
4 See generallyJennifer Hill & Charles M. Yablon, Corporate Governance and Executive
Remuneration: Rediscovering Managerial Positional Conflict, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 294
(2002) (considering how positional conflicts of interest subvert goals of performancebased executive pay).
5 See generally Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration:
Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=561305 (analyzing thirty-eight recommendations for reforming executive compensation).
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versus management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals, which occurred
in the pre-Dodd-Frank period both at the handful of companies that
voluntarily instituted a say-on-pay vote and at financial institutions receiving TARP money. We find that management-sponsored say-onpay proposals attract high levels of support on average-more than
twice as much as the average for shareholder-sponsored proposals.
Looking at which proposals are most likely to attract majority-voting support, management say-on-pay proposals account for the greatest percentage by far. Of the shareholder proposals, those asking that
shareholders "approve" pay practices are the most likely to attract majority support, followed by shareholder proposals seeking say-on-pay
votes, and with proposals to reduce pay or link pay to performance
receiving only single-digit percentage support. Based on this evidence, we project that management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals
after Dodd-Frank will attract high levels of shareholder support, while
only a relatively small fraction of such proposals will fail.
Turning to the influence of recommendations on shareholder
voting from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), our data suggest that in the pre-Dodd-Frank period a "for" ISS recommendation
had approximately a 20% impact on shareholder support for most
categories of executive pay proposals. This seems to be consistently
true for management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals as well as most
categories of shareholder-sponsored proposals. We project that this
will continue in the post-Dodd-Frank period. However, once we take
into account the different recommendations made by management
and ISS, the effect of a negative ISS recommendation becomes much
smaller.
We then look at the preliminary patterns identified by various
sources to discuss whether shareholder voting on executive pay issues
has changed with Dodd-Frank's mandate of a shareholder say on pay.
In particular, we consider whether Dodd-Frank catalyzed additional
shareholder interest in executive pay issues by examining whether the
post-legislation say-on-pay votes tracked, or instead varied from, past
trends in shareholder activism.
Consistent with our expectations from the pre-Dodd-Frank analysis, we see that post-Dodd-Frank shareholders gave, through their sayon-pay votes, broad support to management pay packages. While this
suggests that the voting gesture mandated by Dodd-Frank might be
mostly empty, placement of the issue on the company's ballot may
have changed the dynamics of the shareholder-management dialogue. Poorly performing companies with high levels of executive pay
often experienced greater shareholder dissatisfaction than other firms
and made significant changes to their pay practices after unfavorable
votes.
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Moreover, during the 2011 proxy season, even before the annual
meeting at which the shareholders would have their say on pay, management at a number of companies either changed the company's pay
practices in response to the possibility of a failed shareholder vote or
offered additional disclosure explaining pay practices that had come
onto shareholder radar screens. In short, the mandate for widespread
say-on-pay votes may have led management to be more responsive to
shareholder concerns about executive pay and perhaps corporate governance more generally. This Article proceeds as follows. Part I looks
at the evolution of say-on-pay proposals and voting before DoddFrank, beginning with a fledgling effort to institute company-by-company say-on-pay votes and culminating in actual say-on-pay votes at
some companies that either voluntarily submitted to say on pay or did
so pursuant to the federal financial bailout legislation for financial
institutions receiving TARP funds.
Part II looks at the Dodd-Frank legislation and SEC rules implementing the mandate of say-on-pay votes at U.S. public companies.
We consider the legislative history, as well as the SEC rulemaking, to
identify the justifications (and arguments against) say on pay that
emerged during congressional and agency deliberations. We also survey the academic literature that served to frame the issues-including
the testable hypotheses-on the efficacy and wisdom of say on pay.
Part III explains our methodology and describes our empirical
findings with data from the pre-Dodd-Frank period. Part IV offers an
analysis of the preliminary results reported on voting in the postDodd-Frank period. Part V summarizes and concludes with some policy implications.
I
BEGINNINGS OF SAY ON PAY

Shareholder say on pay is a relatively recent phenomenon in U.S.
public companies. Although say on pay has been mandated in the
United Kingdom for U.K. public companies since 2003,6 it was not
until 2006 that the first shareholder say-on-pay proposals in U.S. public companies were submitted under Rule 14a-8. 7 Their popularity
grew quickly and by 2009 they constituted the largest category of
shareholder-sponsored proposals, regularly garnering majority share6 For a discussion of the arguments for and against enacting the U.K legislation, see
generally Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Should ShareholdersHave a GreaterSay over
Executive Pay?: Learningfrom the US Experience, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 277 (2001).
7
See Challie Dunn & Carol Bowie, RiskMetrics Grp., Evaluating U.S. Company Management Say on Pay Prposals:Four Steps for Investors, SHAREHOLDER FORUM, 4 (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://www.shareholderforum.com/sop/Library/20090316-RiskMetrics.pdf.
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holder support.8 Beginning in 2008 they had also made a foothold in
corporate boardrooms, with a handful of companies voluntarily submitting their executive pay for a shareholder advisory vote. 9
However, events soon overtook this company-by-company approach. As part of the legislative response to the financial crisis of
2008, Congress mandated that all financial firms receiving TARP
funds conduct shareholder say-on-pay votes beginning in 2009.10
Then the Dodd-Frank Act extended the mandate to all U.S. public
companies, with the requirement for say-on-pay votes at shareholder
meetings of larger companies beginning in January 2011 and at
smaller public companies beginning in 2013.11
This section considers the "precocious childhood" of shareholder
advisory votes on executive pay in U.S. public companies-looking
first at the say-on-pay movement built on the Rule 14a-8 process and
then at say on pay as required by the financial-bailout legislation.
A. Shareholder-Sponsored Say-on-Pay Proposals
The first shareholder-sponsored proposals seeking say-on-pay
votes were submitted under Rule 14a-8 during the 2006 proxy season. 12 The proposals, submitted by the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), recommended that the
corporate boards at the targeted companies give shareholders a non13
binding vote on the pay of the company's top executives.
8 See Gary Larkin, The Conference Bd., Say on Pay Takes Early Lead in Proxy Season
Shareholder Proposal Race, GOVERNANCE CTR. BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010), http://tcbblogs.org/
governance/ 2010/03/1 2/say-on-pay-takes-early-lead-in-proxy-season-shareholder-proposalrace (reporting that during the 2009 proxy season there were 255 say-on-pay proposals that
received more than 59% shareholder support).
9 Dunn & Bowie, supra note 7, at 10 (summarizing management-submitted say-onpay votes during the 2008 proxy season at nine companies, with only one company receiving less than 90% shareholder support).
10 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 111(e),
123 Stat. 115, 519.
I1 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
12 See Dunn & Bowie, supra note 7, at 4.
13 See M&A Commentary-"Say on Pay" Shareholder Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation: The New Frontier of Corporate Governance Activism, LATHAM & WATKiNS LLP, 2 (Nov.
2007), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2039_1.pdf. In 2007, the SEC
accepted that shareholder say-on-pay proposals were not per se excludable under Rule 14a8. See Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
397 (Mar. 27, 2007); Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 203713
(Jan. 22, 2008); see also Proposalson Policy for 'Advisory' Votes Regarding Executive Pay Not Excludable, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 370 (Mar. 5, 2007) (reviewing three no-action responses in which SEC staff advised AT&T Inc., Qwest Communications International Inc.,
and Clear Channel Communications Inc. that shareholder say-on-pay proposals are not
excludable).
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These early Rule 14a-8 say-on-pay proposals followed a relatively
fixed formula, with shareholder proponents seeking shareholder support with a resolution as follows:
RESOLVED, that stockholders of [Company] urge the board of directors to adopt a policy that [Company] stockholders be given the
opportunity at each annual meeting of stockholders to vote on an
advisory resolution, to be proposed by [Company's] management,
to approve the report of the ... Compensation Committee set forth
in the proxy statement. The policy should provide that appropriate
disclosures will be made to ensure that stockholders fully understand that the vote is advisory; will not affect any person's compensation; and will not affect the approval of any compensation-related
proposal submitted for a vote of stockholders at the same or any
14
other meeting of stockholders.
As we show in Part III, these 14a-8 say-on-pay shareholder proposals received significant shareholder support, despite uniform manage14
See The Home Depot Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 11 (Apr.
7
14, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/354950/000104 4690600
5182/a2168590zdef14a.htm. The accompanying supporting statement explained:
In our view, senior executive compensation at Home Depot has been
excessive in recent years. In each of the last three years, CEO Robert
Nardelli has been paid a base salary of more than $1,800,000, well in excess
of the IRS cap for deductibility of non-performance-based compensation.
His bonus in each of those years has been at least $4,000,000, and he was
awarded restricted stock valued at over $8,000,000 in 2002, 2003 and 2004.
Mr. Nardelli has also received a disturbingly large amount of compensation
in form of "loan forgiveness" and tax gross-ups related to that forgiveness,
which totaled over $3,000,000 in each of the past three years.
We believe that the current rules governing senior executive compensation do not give stockholders enough influence over pay practices. In the
United Kingdom, public companies allow stockholders to cast an advisory
vote on the "directors' remuneration report." Such a vote isn't binding, but
allows stockholders a clear voice which could help reduce excessive pay.
U.S. stock exchange listing standards do require shareholder approval of
equity-based compensation plans; those plans, however, set general parameters and accord the compensation committee substantial discretion in making awards and establishing performance thresholds for a particular year.
Stockholders do not have any mechanism for providing ongoing input on
the application of those general standards to individual pay packages....
Similarly, performance criteria submitted for stockholder approval to
allow a company to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million are also
broad and do not constrain compensation committees in setting performance targets for particular executives. Withholding votes from compensation committee members who are standing for reelection is a blunt
instrument for registering dissatisfaction with the way in which the committee has administered compensation plans and policies in the previous year.
Accordingly, we urge Home Depot's board to allow stockholders to express their opinion about senior executive compensation practices by establishing an annual referendum process. The results of such a vote would, we
think, provide Home Depot with useful information about whether stockholders view the company's compensation practices, as reported each year
in the Leadership Development and Compensation Committee Report, to
be in stockholders' best interests.
We urge stockholders to vote for this proposal.
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ment hostility. 15 Management opposed the proposals on the ground
that the board of directors is charged by corporate law and stock exchange rules with setting the terms of pay for the company's top executives. Shareholder input, it was said, would diminish the
effectiveness of the board's role. A typical response, like the one here
by Home Depot, went as follows:
The Company believes that an advisory resolution would not
change the contents of the Committee's [detailed compensation
discussion and analysis] report nor have any legal consequence on
any compensation arrangement. Most importantly, an advisory vote
would not provide the Committee with any meaningful insight into
specific shareholder concerns regarding executive compensation
that it could address when considering the Company's remuneration policies. Finally, an advisory vote is impractical when more efconcerns to the Committee are
fective means of communicating
16
available to shareholders.
Although boards at first ignored say-on-pay proposals, even when approved by a shareholder majority, 17 within a few years, as we discuss in
Part III, some companies began voluntarily to hold advisory say-on-pay
18
votes.
Beginning in 2008, ISS took the position that shareholders
should generally vote for shareholder-sponsored say-on-pay proposals
that call on management to submit the pay of top executives to a nonbinding shareholder vote. 19 As for management-sponsored say-on-pay
proposals, ISS urged for the 2008 proxy season a case-by-case approach and called for an "against" vote when "boards have failed to
demonstrate good stewardship of investors' interests regarding executive compensation practices." 20 ISS identified five principles to apply:
(1) "pay-for-performance alignment"; (2) avoid "pay for failure"; (3)
maintain an effective compensation committee; (4) provide clear,
15
16
17

See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
The Home Depot, Inc., supra note 14, at 12.
See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REv. 987, 1012

(2010).
18
Id. at 1036 (describing say-on-pay votes at Aflac in 2008 and similar votes in 2009 at
Verizon, Blockbuster, Occidental Petroleum, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, MBIA, Motorola, and
Ingersoll Rand).
19 The first ISS recommendation addressing shareholder-submitted say on pay came
in 2008. See ISS GovERNANCE SERVS., 2008 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary 40
(2007), available at http://www.usbank.com/pcg/pdf/US2008SummaryGuidelines.pdf
[hereinafter ISS 2008 GUIDELINES]. Before 2008, the ISS voting guidelines took no position on say-on-pay proposals. See generally ISS GOVERNANCE SERVS., CONCISE SUMMARY OF ISS
2007 PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES (2006), available at www.foxbycorp.com/PDF/
2007SummaryPolicy.pdf.
20
ISS 2008 GUIDELINES, supranote 19, at 35; ISS GOVERNANCE SERVS., U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES CONCISE SUMMARY 11 (2009), available at https://www.vcim.ca/pdfs/
2008USConciseSummaryGuidelines.pdf.
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comprehensive pay disclosure; and (5) "[a]void inappropriate pay to
21
non-executive directors."
B.

Effects of Shareholder-Sponsored Pay Proposals

Shareholder interest during the late 2000s in the early say-on-pay
movement coincided with a trend of growing interest by shareholders
in executive pay issues. In the mid-1990s, shareholders had voted on a
variety of shareholder-sponsored proposals on executive pay but generally with relatively low levels of shareholder support.22 Then in the
mid-2000s, shareholder activists began to target companies with high
pay levels, resulting in higher levels of shareholder support and com23
pany implementation.
An early study by Thomas and Martin of executive compensation
shareholder proposals from the mid-1990s found seven major categories of shareholder pay proposals: reports to shareholders prepared
by management or committees of directors to review executive pay
practices, increased disclosure about pay levels and practices, shareholder approval for specified payments to executives, caps on the
amounts of executive pay awarded without investor approval, links between pay and performance, reductions in the use of certain types of
pay, and restrictions on total annual executive pay. 24 Typically, these
shareholder-sponsored proposals were targeted at relatively poor-performing companies with higher levels of pay, but generally received
lower levels of voting support than other types of shareholder proposals seeking corporate governance reforms. 25 However, Thomas and
Martin found that when proposals received higher levels of support,
targeted firms significantly reduced the rate of increase of executive
pay over the two-year period following a well-supported proposal. 26
A more recent study by Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu of shareholdersponsored executive pay proposals from 1997 to 2007 found that activists target companies with high executive pay. 27 They also concluded
that shareholder support levels were higher at firms with "excess"
CEO pay. 28 They found that shareholders prefer proposals that relate
to the pay-setting process, such as requirements to submit pay for
21
22

ISS 2008 GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 35.
See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on

Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1021, 1046 (1999) (noting that in 1994, shareholder-sponsored executive compensation proposals received favorable votes in only
12.8% of cases).
23
SeeYonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Volkan Muslu, ShareholderActivism and CEO Pay,
24 REv. FIN. STUD. 535, 576 (2011).
24
See Thomas & Martin, supra note 22, at 1073.
25
See id. at 1021-22.
26
See id. at 1066-67.
27
See Ertimur, Ferri & Muslu, supra note 23, at 576.
28
Id.
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shareholder approval, and that such proposals were more likely to be
implemented. 2 9 Targeted firms whose CEOs' pay was "excessive" sub30
sequently reduced CEO pay substantially.
Both of these studies suggest that a say-on-pay vote-as mandated
by Dodd-Frank-would allow shareholders to signal their discontent
with pay practices at particular companies, which could well lead to
company pay reforms. A common finding of the studies is that proposals that receive more shareholder support are more likely to result
in changes at targeted firms, especially in CEO-pay reductions and, in
the later study, changes to pay practices as well. This suggests that
giving shareholders a say-on-pay vote could have similar effects, particularly when shareholders have signaled their dissatisfaction with company pay levels or practices.
A third study by Cai and Walking adds further clarity to the picture. 31 The authors conducted an event study on the stock market
reaction to the enactment of say-on-pay legislation and found a statistically significant positive market reaction for firms with abnormally
3 2
high levels of CEO pay and low pay-for-performance sensitivity.
However, looking at pay proposals from 2006 to 2008, they found that
the pay proposals were targeted at companies without those characteristics and that the market responded favorably to their defeat. 33 They
concluded that say-on-pay votes might create value for companies with
34
inefficient compensation structures but not for other firms.
C.

Mandatory Say on Pay for TARP Recipients

The financial crisis of 2008 moved say on pay from the activist
shareholder toolbox to the legislative agenda. Responding to the
public outcry that federal bailout funds were being used to pay executive bonuses, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA) required that financial firms receiving TARP funds give their
shareholders an advisory vote on executive pay. 35 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the financial stimulus plan)
also imposed the say-on-pay requirement for financial firms that had
36
outstanding TARP debts.
29

Id. at 574.

30

Id.

31

Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walking, Shareholders' Say on Pay: Does It Create Value?,J. FIN. &

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
(forthcoming),
papers.cfm?abstractid=1030925.
32 Id. (manuscript at 1).

33
34
35

available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/

Id. (manuscript at 5).
Id. (manuscript at 6).
12 U.S.C. § 5221(e) (2006).

36 See Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 111 (e), 123 Stat. 115, 519. Thus, financial companies with
outstanding TARP funds are required to submit executive pay to a shareholder vote under
both TARP and Dodd-Frank. The SEC has made clear that only one vote, however, is
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In 2009, the SEC adopted rules for say on pay at TARP-funded
firms. 3 7 The SEC amended its proxy rules to require TARP recipients
to permit a separate shareholder advisory vote on the firm's executive
pay, as disclosed under the SEC proxy rules. The SEC did not take a
position on the utility of the say-on-pay vote but explained it was simply implementing the congressional say-on-pay mandate. All told,
about 280 financial firms that received TARP funds held say-on-pay
38
votes during the 2010 proxy season.
The EESA mandate of say on pay for financial firms receiving
TARP money expanded the shareholder say-on-pay movement, which
had already targeted pay practices at certain financial services firms.
Unlike a vote "for" a shareholder 14a-8 proposal requesting the company board to implement a shareholder vote on compensation practices (which generally reflected dissatisfaction with existing pay
practices or levels), these new mandatory management-sponsored
proposals asked shareholders to vote in favor of approving current pay
practices. Thus, a higher "for" vote on a management-sponsored sayon-pay proposal reflects greater shareholder support for the company's existing pay regime.
Voting advisors continued to play an important role with these
new proposals. In 2010, when say-on-pay became mandatory at TARPfunded firms, ISS changed its approach and focused its guidelines on
management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals. The ISS proxy-voting
guidelines no longer simply identified voting principles, but called for
an "against" vote on management say-on-pay proposals if there was:
(1) "a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance";
(2) "problematic pay practices"; or (3) "poor communication and responsiveness [by the board] to shareholders."3 9 The 2010 guidelines
necessary to satisfy both statutory requirements. See Shareholder Approval of Executive
Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 9178, Exchange Act Release No. 63,768, 2011 WL 231597, at *25 (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter SEC
Executive Compensation Release] (noting that the vote under EESA is"effectively" the
same as required by Dodd-Frank). Given that TARP recipients are required to conduct a
say-on-pay vote annually, the SEC has exempted such firms from a vote on the frequency of
say on pay. See id. at 57-58 (discussing the exemption from Rule 14a-21(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-21 (b) (2011)).
37
See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, Exchange Act Release No. 61,335, 75 Fed. Reg. 2789-01 (Jan. 19, 2010) [hereinafter SEC
TARP Release] (adopting Rule 14a-20, § 240.14a-20, which requires that TARP recipients
provide a separate nonbinding shareholder vote to approve compensation of executives
whenever shareholders vote at an annual meeting involving election of directors).
38
Scott Hirst, The 2010 Proxy Season: A Brave New World, HARv. L. ScH. F. ON CoRP.
GovERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 7, 2010, 9:13 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/
2010/09/07/the-2010-proxy-season-a-brave-new-world (posting of material prepared by
David Drake).
39
ISS GOVERNANCE SERVS., U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES CONCISE SUMMARY 11-12
(2010), available at http://www.westcore.com/Misc/~/media/Files/Westcore/2010%20
US%20Policy%2OConcise%2OSummary%20Guidelinesrevised.ashx.
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also made the "management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item" the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices, stating that "dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting
against the MSOP rather than withholding or voting against the compensation committee.

40

The EESA mandate expanded the pool of firms subject to advisory say-on-pay votes beyond those targeted by shareholders as having
"bad" compensation practices, and so it was predictable that shareholder voting support in 2010 for say-on-pay proposals increased. In
fact, during the 2010 proxy season, our pre-Dodd-Frank analysis
shows that shareholders at TARP-funded firms on average voted
41
88.7% in support of management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals.
This is interesting given that most mandatory say-on-pay votes in 2010
were held largely at financial firms receiving TARP money where one
might have expected shareholders to be more skeptical of executive
pay practices.
II
DODD-FRANK SAY-ON-PAY MANDATE

A. Legislative Mandate
Section 951 of Dodd-Frank requires public companies to give
their shareholders an advisory vote to approve or disapprove of the
42
compensation paid to named executives during the prior fiscal year.
Dodd-Frank also requires an advisory vote by shareholders on how frequently the say-on-pay vote is to occur and on golden-parachute payments in any acquisition or merger. 43 None of these votes, however, is
to carry any mandatory force or change directors' duties to shareholders; thus, Dodd-Frank makes clear that any shareholder vote should
not be construed to overrule any decision by the company or its
board, or to imply any additional fiduciary duties. 44
Dodd-Frank requires that management present "a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives," though the vote "shall not be binding on the issuer or the
board of directors. '45 The inclusion by management of a say-on-pay
proposal does not limit the ability of shareholders to make their own
40

Id. at ll.

41

See infta Part III.A.2.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-

42

203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1375, 1899 (2010) (adding new section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
43
Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (a), (b) (Supp. IV 2010)).
44
d. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (c)(l)-(c) (3)).
45 Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a) (1), (c)). In addition, affected companies must
hold an advisory vote at least every six years on whether the say-on-pay vote will occur every
one, two, or three years. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (a) (2)).
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proposals "for inclusion in the proxy materials related to executive
46
compensation."
B.

Implementing SEC Rules

The SEC implemented section 951 of Dodd-Frank with detailed
requirements that specify the form of the say-on-pay proposal and the
executive officers whose pay is subject to a shareholder vote. The SEC
required say-on-pay votes at public companies with more than $75 million in a public equity float beginning with shareholder meetings held
after January 21, 2011.47

The say-on-pay vote applies only to the company's CEO and the
four other executive officers named in the company's proxy compensation table. 48 The vote relates to the compensation disclosed in the
proxy statement as described in the "Compensation Discussion and
Analysis" (CD&A).49 The vote is up or down as to the overall compensation package and not as to the specific elements of compensation
(such as bonuses, stock options, retirement pay, and performance
incentives) .50

The results of the say-on-pay vote must be disclosed on Form 8-K
within four business days after the shareholders' meeting. 51 In addition, the company must disclose, in the next year's CD&A, whether
46

Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (c) (4)).

47
SEC Executive Compensation Release, supra note 36, at *1, *48. Smaller reporting
companies become subject to the say-on-pay voting requirement for annual meetings after
January 21, 2013. Id. at *1.
48
See 17. C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011) (requiring a say-on-pay vote, at annual share-

holder meetings at which directors are elected, for named executives whose compensation
is disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K). The compensation of directors is not
subject to a mandatory say-on-pay vote. See SEC TARP Release, supra note 37, at *9.
49
The SEC rule does not require that the management-submitted say-on-pay proposal
be phrased in a particular way, though it must indicate that the proposal seeks a shareholder vote " ' to approve the compensation of executives as disclosed pursuant to [Item
402 of Regulation S-K].'" SEC TARP Release, supra note 37, at *9 (alterations in original)
(quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78n-l(a)(1) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010)). A suggested proposal calls on shareholders to approve "compensation
paid... as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including the Compensation
Discussion and Analysis, compensation tables and narrative discussion." Id. at *9 n.68. A
vote to approve only compensation policies and procedures would not pass muster. Id at
*9-10.
50
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (a). In addition, the SEC added a comment to Rule 14a-8
that companies will be allowed to exclude shareholder-submitted proposals under the rule
if the shareholder proposes a say-on-pay vote with "substantially the same scope as the sayon-pay vote required by Rule 14a-21 (a)." SEC Executive Compensation Release, supra note
36, at *21.
51
See SEC Form 8-K, Item 5.07; see also SEC Executive Compensation Release, supra
note 36, at *23 (changing disclosure on shareholder vote on say-on-pay frequency but not
shareholder votes on say-on-pay resolution).
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and how the board considered the results of the shareholder say-on52
pay vote in making any decisions.

In implementing the say-on-pay mandate of Dodd-Frank, the SEC
did not consider the usefulness of the vote. Nor did the agency speculate on how say on pay would affect pay practices or levels. Those
matters, in effect, had already been considered in the debate we summarize below.
C. Debate over Mandatory Say on Pay
Even before Congress enacted its say-on-pay mandate in DoddFrank, an active academic debate emerged on whether a federally
mandated shareholder vote on executive pay was a good idea and
whether it could be effective. The academic debate on say on pay
mirrored in many ways the basic debate of whether mandatory corporate law-particularly at the federal level-should displace enabling
state law. That is, say on pay raised the question whether a mandatory
shareholder role in executive pay held uniformly across all public
companies was preferable to a voluntary company-by-company approach permitted by state law and facilitated by shareholder proposals
under the process specified in Rule 14a-8.
In the end, the debate revealed a host of questions and supposed
answers on what say on pay would produce. Sometimes the answers
stemmed from different attitudes about whether and how executive
pay was a problem in U.S. corporations; at other times the answers
reflected varying philosophies toward the role of shareholder voting
in U.S. corporations; and yet at other times the answers looked at the
existing evidence on say on pay but still reached opposite conclusions.
1. Lessons from UK. Experience
Much of the academic debate has hinged on the U.K. experience
with say on pay for U.K. listed companies. In 2002, the United Kingdom became the first country to enact legislation mandating a shareholder vote on executive pay. 53

The legislation required U.K.-

incorporated listed companies to submit a "Director's Remuneration
Report" annually to shareholders and to hold a nonbinding shareholder advisory vote on that report.54 The U.K say-on-pay mandate
52 See SEC Executive Compensation Release, supra note 36, at *11 (amending Item
402(b) (1) to disclose how a company "considered the results of previous shareholder [sayon-pay] votes.., in determining compensation policies and decisions and, if so, how that
consideration has affected its compensation policies and decisions"). The disclosure is
limited to the company's response to the most recent say-on-pay vote. See id. at *12-13.
53 Steven Deane, Say on Pay: Results from Overseas, CORP. BD., Jul.-Aug. 2007, at 11,
11-12.
54 Sudhakar Balachandran, Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Solving the Executive Compensation Problem Through Shareholder Votes? Evidence from the U.K. 6 (Nov. 2007)
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sought to address concerns among the public and institutional inves55
tors about excessive executive pay.

Other countries followed suit, with Australia and the Netherlands
enacting say-on-pay legislation in 2004.56 The Dutch law calls for a
binding shareholder vote, not merely an advisory one, but the vote
does not necessarily happen annually, and the shareholder vote concerns compensation policies, not a retrospective pay report. 57 Following the Dutch model, Sweden in 2006 and Norway in 2007 also
enacted legislation requiring a binding shareholder vote on compensation policies.

58

In testimony before the Senate committee considering what
would become Dodd-Frank, Professor John Coates concluded that the
U.K.'s experience had been positive:
Different researchers have conducted several investigations [on the
U.K. say-on-pay experience] . .. [T] hese findings suggest that "sayon-pay" legislation would have a positive impact on corporate governance in the U.S. While the two legal contexts are not identical,
there is no evidence in the existing literature to suggest that the
differences would turn what would be a good idea in the U.K into a
59
bad one in the U.S.

Coates's testimony drew principally from a study by Fabrizio Ferri
and David Maber, comparing U.K. pay practices before and after the
U.K. say-on-pay mandate. 60 Ferri and Maber, examining the impact of
the U.K. legislation on stock prices in high-pay companies and actual
voting results under the U.K. say-on-pay regime, identified a favorable
shareholder reaction to the legislation and pay reforms at companies
receiving negative votes on their pay practices:
We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the United Kingdom (UK). Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say
on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announce-

ment triggered a positive stock price reaction at firms with weak
penalties for poor performance. UK firms responded to negative
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www7.gsb.columbia.edu/ciber/sites/default/files/balchandranCIBERGrant_Paper UK Voting.pdf.
55
Id.
56 Deane, supra note 53, at 12.
57
See Regan Adamson & Daniel Lumm, ShareholderDemocracy and the Say on Pay Movement: Progress, But How Do You Define Success? 6 (Wake Forest L. Rev. Working Paper Series,
2009).
58

Id.

See Protecting Shareholders and EnhancingPublic Confidence by Improving Corporate Governance:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking,Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 47 (2009) (prepared statement of John C. Coates IV, John F.
Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-11 shrg55479/pdf/CHRG-11 shrg55479.pdf.
60
See id.
59
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say on pay voting outcomes by removing controversial CEO pay
practices criticized as rewards for failure (e.g., generous severance
contracts) and increasing the sensitivity of pay to poor realizations
6
of performance. '
In a previous study, Ferri and Maber, along with Sudhakar Balachandran, also concluded that the new rule had increased pay-for-performance sensitivity at U.K. companies:
Based on a large sample of UK firms over the period from 2000 to
2005, we find evidence of enhanced sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to negative operating performance and enhanced sensitivity of CEO total compensation to negative operating and stock
performance after the new rule, consistent with widespread calls for
62
less "rewards for failure" that had led to its introduction.
Academic Debate over Say on Pay

2.

The academic debate on say on pay predating Dodd-Frank largely
accepted that even an advisory shareholder vote on corporate pay
practices would alter the shareholder role in corporate governance.
Views varied along ideological lines, with academics who rued the rise
of shareholder activism concluding that say on pay would undermine
the efficiency of a "board centrism," while academics who supported a
move toward shareholder primacy seeing say on pay as a natural step
in that direction. These issues and the respective academics' positions
are summarized below.
a.

Shift in CorporateBalance of Power?

Academic proponents of say on pay anticipated more transparency and accountability in the corporation and thus presumably
greater efficiency and social responsiveness. These proponents argued that say on pay would help boards overcome psychological barriers and negotiate pay packages with CEOs more effectively on behalf
63
of shareholders.
Academic skeptics of say on pay saw a federally mandated shareholder vote on executive pay-whether advisory or binding-as upset61
Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence
from the UK, REv. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript abstract), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-1420394 (last updated Nov. 25, 2011).
62
Balachandran, Ferri & Maber, supra note 54, at 1.
63
See Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation:Hearing on HR. 1257 Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., II0th Cong. 68 (2007) (written testimony of Lucian A. Bebchuk,
William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and
Finance, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Bebchuk Testimony], available at http://
Draft Polwww.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg35402/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg35402.pdf;
icy Briefing, Stephen Davis, Does 'Say on Pay' Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation
Accountable (Millstein Ctr. for Corp. Governance & Performance, Yale Sch. of Mgmt., New
Haven, C.T.), 2007, at 7-8.
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ting the balance of authority between the corporate board and
shareholders. Professor Steven Bainbridge, for example, argued that
say on pay would "shift power from boards of directors not to shareholders but to advisory firms" that both advise and rate companies on
64
corporate governance matters.
Others pointed out that a mandatory say-on-pay vote is unnecessary, as shareholders could already express their concerns about executive pay-through dialogue with management, with the casting of
"no" or "withhold" votes on directors sitting on underperforming
proposals seeking
compensation committees, and with shareholder
65
votes.
say-on-pay
company-by-company
Along this skeptical line of inquiry, some scholars predicted that
the mandatory vote would create few benefits-as it was already possible for shareholders to seek such a vote prior to Dodd-Frank-and
was certain to produce additional costs. In comments on an early sayon-pay bill, Professor Steven Kaplan stated:
In contrast, H.R. 1257 would mandate a non-binding shareholder
vote to approve the compensation of executives for every company
every year. Companies with problems will have a vote and, presumably, will receive a negative vote. But this is almost exactly what happens under the current system. So, it is not clear to me that the new
66
bill would create any benefits.

Kaplan further argued that "increased transparency for CEO pay required by the new SEC disclosure rules should further reduce any re67
maining unwise compensation practices.
b.

Shareholders Lack Focus on Say on Pay?

Supporters of say on pay assumed shareholders would do their
homework, would be able to discern poorly designed pay packages,
and would be emboldened to vote against them.68 If they needed
64
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank 4
(UCLA Sch. L. Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-14, Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1698898.
See Letter from Timothy J. Bard, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ctr. on
65
Exec. Comp., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Sept. 8, 2009), available atwww.sec.gov/
comments/s7-12-09/s71209-46.pdf.
66
Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: Hearingon Hi?. 125 7 Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 126 (testimony of Steven N. Kaplan, Neubauer Family
Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago) [hereinafter Kaplan
Testimony], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg35402/pdf/
CHRG-1 10hhrg35402.pdf.
Id. at 121.
67
68
Bebchuk Testimony, supra note 63, at 65-66 (concluding that say-on-pay votes "will
annually provide companies with valuable information about how their shareholders view
company performance in this critical test").
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help, ISS and the other proxy advisory firms would be there to provide
it.

Critics, however, questioned whether shareholders would be able
to discern differences in pay plans. Professor Jeffrey Gordon doubted
the likelihood of shareholder interest, pointing to the U.K experience, where shareholders had invariably approved pay packages put to
a vote-with only eight negative votes in the first six years of the U.K.
69
experience with say on pay.

Gordon argued that it was unlikely that U.S. shareholders would
give individualized attention to compensation schemes at the
thousands of U.S. public companies. 70 In addition, he looked at the
first couple of years of experience with say-on-pay shareholder proposals and concluded that say on pay had not been embraced by
71
shareholders.
Gordon further noted that the number of shareholder say-on-pay
proposals had been relatively constant. 72 Moreover, overall shareholder support had leveled off at about 42%, suggesting that most
shareholders were not taken by the concept. 73 Repeating this point in
congressional testimony, Professor J.W. Verret noted that most shareholders have voted against shareholder say-on-pay proposals:
Just last year, seven [ty] proposals for say-on-pay were introduced at
companies in 2008, ten of them were successful.
The average vote was a 60 percent vote against say-on-pay by the
shareholders. At financial companies it is even higher. 70 percent
was the average vote against say-on-pay at financial companies. So
shareholders ...

at the majority of companies in a very strong ma-

74
jority way have expressed dissatisfaction with say-on-pay proposals.
Some critics also predicted that some shareholders would use say-onpay to advance political agendas. In testimony before Congress in
2007, Kaplan predicted:
At the same time, the [say-on-pay] bill would mandate a vote for
companies that do not have a problem. This... potentially subjects
69 Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Say on Pay" Cautionary Notes on the UK. Experience and the Case
for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 323, 341 (2009) (explaining that "shareholders
invariably approve the Directors Remuneration Report, with perhaps eight turndowns
across thousands of votes over a six-year experience").
70
See id. at 351.
71
See id. at 339 ("The number of [say-on-pay] proposals grew only moderately [in
2008], to seventy, and the level of shareholder support has remained at the same level,
approximately forty-two percent.").
72 See id.
73 Id.
74
Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
111 th Cong. 52-53 (2009) (statement of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor, George Mason
Univ. Sch. L.) [hereinafter Verret Testimony], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-11 hhrg52398/pdf/CHRG-11 hhrg52398.pdf.
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these boards and companies to increased pressure from interest
groups that they do not incur today. One can imagine politically
oriented shareholders attempting to make political statements in
75
their votes.
76
The empirical evidence on this point, though, is mixed.
c.

Increased Sway of Proxy Advisory Firms?

Some skeptics commented that say on pay would only increase
the power of proxy advisory firms, whose purportedly one-size-fits-all
recommendations would be followed blindly by institutional shareholders. 77 These critics argued that management will thus become
manacled by shareholders, undermining their discretionary authority. 78 The critics also were concerned that ISS recommendations
could be biased since the firm both provides voting advice on pay
79
packages and consults with companies on adopting pay policies.
Similarly, Gordon predicted that institutional shareholders would
rely on proxy advisory firms, which would wield undue influence over
voting on executive pay.8 0 Gordon further predicted that activist
shareholders would focus only selectively on a narrow range of compensation schemes, namely those identified as problematic by proxy
advisory firms.
In this same vein, Verret stated in congressional testimony:
[W]e have seen in Britain ...

that concentration of the proxy advi-

sory firms has caused sort of a one-size-fits-all solution to take hold
in pay. I think it is better to have a flexible approach, that compensation committees should have the flexibility to design compensation proposals appropriate for their own businesses. 8 1
Nonetheless, ISS (and other proxy advisory firms) may serve the
purpose of helping shareholders, particularly institutional sharehold75
76

Kaplan Testimony, supra note 66, at 126.
Compare Cai & Walking, supra note 31, at 32-33 (finding negative market reaction

to pay proposals sponsored by labor unions) with Ertimur, Ferri & Muslu, supra note 23, at
2-3 (finding that unions are not more likely to target firms that are unionized or engaged
in disputes with unions). See generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning
CorporateGovernance: ShareholderActivism by Labor Unions, 96 MicH. L. REv. 1018 (1998) (discussing labor union shareholder activism).
77
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 64, at 4-5 (arguing that RiskMetrics, the most important proxy advisory firm, faces conflicts arising from its dual roles in advising and rating
companies on corporate governance matters).
78
See Stephen N. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II,
95 MIN. L. REv. 1779, 1815 (2011).
79
See CENTER ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY
STATUS Quo 7-8 (2011), available at http://www.execcomp.org/docs/c11-07a%2OProxy
%20Advisory%2OWhite%2Paper%20-FULL%20COLOR_.pdf.
80
See Gordon, supra note 69, at 351-52.
81 Verret Testimony, supra note 74, at 68.
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ers, collectivize and use their voting power in a coordinated way.8 2
For example, Professor Lynn Stout has pointed out that
" [w] hen institutional investors follow ISS [vote recommendations] en
masse, directors of public corporations can expect to see 20%, 30%
even 50% of their company's shares being voted not as the directors
recommend, but as ISS recommends." 83 By creating and periodically
revising its "best practices" voting guidelines-often based on input
from its institutional clients-ISS fosters institutional shareholder activism and helps those clients with fiduciary obligations to vote and
thus protect plan assets. 84 Without this coordinating function, institu-

tional shareholders would bear the costs of doing their own voting
research, leading to classic collective action problems and the under85
production of valuable monitoring and voting information.
In addition, ISS has taken on the role of serving as representative
for shareholder voting interests. 8 6 ISS thus serves, on behalf of shareholders, as a monitor of company activities-reviewing director performance, shareholder proposals, and voting contests, and
formulating advice to shareholders on how to vote-both for paying
clients and others who use the publicly available ISS voting
recommendations.

d.

87

Dampen Excesses in Executive Pay?

Some advocates of say on pay predicted that a shareholder say-onpay vote would dampen the upward spiral in executive pay. For example, activist institutional shareholders, such as AFSCME, anticipated
that a shareholder say-on-pay vote might reduce alleged excesses in
executive pay.88 One well-known academic predicted that say-on-pay
82 This coordination function is illustrated by the say-on-pay voting during the 2011
proxy season, when all of the companies that failed to receive majority support for their
say-on-pay resolutions had also received an "against" recommendation by ISS. See infra Part
IV.A.3.
83
Lynn A. Stout, Why Should ISS Be the New Masterof the Corporate Governance Universe?,
CORP. GOVERNANCE, Jan. 4, 2006, at 14-15 .
84 Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 899-903 (2007)
(describing business and operations of ISS).
85

See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 389-94 (1986)

(describing share-

holder voting in public corporations, which presents collective action problems similar to
the "prisoner's dilemma").
86 See Robin Sidel et al., ISS Is Put in the Spotlight as H-P Claims Victory, WALL ST.J., Mar.
20, 2002, at C20 (stating that ISS's recommendation for the Hewlett-Packard and Compaq
merger "helped bolster H-P's position in one of the most contentious proxy battles in
recent years").
87 Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher FinancingProosalfor
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 294-98 (2003) (describing ISS's role and
influence).
88

ARCHIE B. CARROLL & ANN K. BUCHHOLTZ, BUSINESS & SOCIETrx. ETHICS AND STAKE-

HOLDER MANAGEMENT 812-13 (7th ed. 2008) (describing AFSCME's decision to seek a say-

on-pay vote at Home Depot).
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votes would make directors "somewhat more attentive" to shareholder
views and "might deter some egregious compensation arrangements."89
Other scholars have less glowing views. In a 2001 article critiquing the idea of say on pay (and anticipating the reform movement),
Professors Brian Cheffins and Randall Thomas concluded that say on
pay would probably be used by U.S. shareholders in a discerning fashion, but only to vote down pay arrangements that deviated "far from
the norm."90 They predicted that say on pay would probably not realize some investors' hopes of stifling the upward spiral in executive
pay.91
More pessimistically, Gordon pointed to the U.K experience with
say on pay and cautioned that adopting say on pay in the United
States would be a "dubious choice." 92 Gordon pointed out that during the first six years of say on pay in U.K public companies, shareholders invariably approved the pay plans put to a vote, with no
perceptible control of the upward spiral in U.K executive pay. 9 3 Instead, he found that executive pay in U.K public companies continued to rise "significantly" and the growth rate for long-term incentive
94
plans has been higher than in the United States.
e.

Strengthen Pay-for-PerformanceRelationship?

But even more than the debate on whether say on pay would affect overall increases in executive pay, the academic debate turned on
whether a shareholder vote would create a stronger relationship between "pay and performance" and reduce the incidence of "pay for
failure. ' 95 In testimony before Congress, Professor Lucian Bebchuk
urged that shareholders receive an advisory vote on executive pay at
U.S. companies, concluding that such a vote would allow shareholders
to express their views on flawed pay practices, particularly pay uncon96
nected with company performance.

89 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, RegulatingBankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247,
276 (2010) (commenting on possible effects of say on pay for TARP recipients).
90
Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 6, at 310.
91 Id. at 310, 315 (explaining that empirical studies on the say-on-pay experience in
the United States "do[ ] not provide an endorsement for major reform").
92 Gordon, supra note 69, at 325.
93
See id. at 341 ("[S]hareholders invariably approve the Directors Remuneration Report, with perhaps eight turndowns across thousands of votes over a six-year experience.").
94

See id.

95

See generally Ferri & Maber, supra note 61.
Bebchuk Testimony, supra note 63, at 68-70.

96
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In response, some critics of say on pay questioned the premise
that pay and performance are actually decoupled 7 In testimony
before the House Committee on Financial Services in 2007, Kaplan
stated:
While there have clearly been abuses and unethical CEOs, pay for
the typical CEO appears to be largely driven by market forces....
Firms with CEOs in the top decile of actual pay earned stock returns
that were 90% greater than those of other firms in their industries
over the previous 5 years. Firms with CEOs in the bottom decile of
actual pay underperformed their industries by almost 40% in the
previous 5 years. The results are qualitatively similar if we look at
performance over the previous three years or previous year. There
can be absolutely no doubt that the typical CEO in the U.S. is paid
for performance. 98
Nonetheless, in a detailed study of the U.K. say-on-pay experience
that looked at both disclosed changes in compensation contracts and
estimated undisclosed changes (through a regression of CEO pay
based on economic determinants), Professors Ferri and Maber summarized their conclusions:
We document a positive market reaction to the announcement of
say on pay regulation for firms with controversial CEO pay practices
and, more specifically, weak penalties for poor performance, consistent with shareholders perceiving say on pay as a value enhancing
monitoring mechanism. We also find that firms respond to high
voting dissent by removing controversial provisions criticized as rewards for failure, such as long notice periods and retesting provisions for option grants. Finally, we find a significant increase in the
sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance, particularly among
firms that experience high dissent at the first vote and firms with
99
excess CEO pay before the regulation.

3.

CongressionalDebate over Say on Pay

The academic debate also echoed in Congress, where say on pay
was first proposed in the House of Representatives in 2006.100 The
97
Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 1809 (surveying literature on whether U.S. executive
pay schemes decoupled executive compensation from performance and concluding that
the "core premise behind say-on-pay remains, at best, unproven").
98 Kaplan Testimony, supra note 66, at 122-23 (describing his paper with Josh Rauh
that looked at CEO pay from 1999 to 2004).
99 Ferri & Maber, supra note 61, at 26.
100 Say on pay in Congress dates back to 2005, when Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), Chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services, introduced legislation providing
shareholders with a nonbinding, advisory vote on executive compensation practices. See
Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act, H.R. 4291, 109th Cong. (2005),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr4291ih/pdf/BILLS-109hr4291ih.
pdf. In 2007, a similar provision was part of the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, which passed the House of Representatives, but did not advance in the Senate.
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congressional debate intensified in March 2009, when the House
Committee on Financial Services held hearings in the wake of reports
of sizeable executive bonuses at financial firms that had received
bailout funds (such as American International Group (AIG)), thus
leading to the legislation that required say on pay for financial firms
receiving TARP funds. 1° 1 The debate came to a head in June 2009,
when the House Committee held hearings on expanding say on pay to
all public companies, eventually approving the say-on-pay provisions
10 2
incorporated into the Dodd-Frank Act.
The say-on-pay provisions were contentious.' 0 3 Congressional
supporters-repeating many of the points made by academic supporters-anticipated that say-on-pay: (1) would empower shareholders to
vote down pay structures that encourage excessive risk taking, 0 4 (2)
"would be a very significant move forward in terms of transparency
and accountability,"' 0 5 (3) would help arrest the upward spiral in
CEO pay,' 0 6 and (4) would compel corporate boards to align pay with
the corporation's financial performance. 0 7 In short, the legislative
supporters of say on pay predicted that a mandatory shareholder vote
See H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by House, April 20, 2007), availableathttp://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1257eh/pdf/BILLS-110hrl257eh.pdf; S. 1181, 110th
Cong. (2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110sl181is/pdf/BILLS110sl l8lis.pdf.
101 Prompted by the bailout of AIG in September 2008, the Financial Services Committee resurrected say on pay in 2009, holding hearings in March 2009 to investigate pay
practices at AIG and in the financial services industry. See Oversight of the Federal Government's Intervention at American InternationalGroup: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
llth Cong. 5-6 (2009), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/
1 11 20
- .pdf. The hearings led to say-on-pay provisions in the American
financialsvcs.dem/
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which built on restrictions on executive pay under
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, and required the SEC to issue say-onpay regulations for financial firms receiving funds under TARP.
102 The result was the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act,
passing the House in July 2009. H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009) (as passed by House, July
31, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-11 lhr3269eh/pdf/BILLS11lhr3269eh.pdf.
103
Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 1808 (identifying support from institutional shareholders-such as the Council of Institutional Shareholders and the Investor's Working
Group-and organized labor-such as AFSCME and the AFL-CIO-with opposition from
organized management groups-including the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
104
Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
llth Cong. 1-2 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk]
(statement of Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.); id. at 5 (statement
of Rep. David Scott) (arguing that executive pay systems have "no downside" for an executive's failure).
105 Id. at 13 (statement of Gene Sperling, Counselor to the Sec'y of the Treasury, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury).
106 See H.R. REP.No. 110-88, at 3 (2007) (noting that median CEO pay had grown to
$13.5 million during the 2005 fiscal year at the 1,400 largest U.S. public companies).
107 Hearingon Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk, supra note 104, at 4-5 (statement
of Rep. David Scott).

1236

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1213

would alter the balance of power in U.S. public corporations, especially regarding executive pay, and thus move it decidedly toward
shareholders. As Gene Sperling from the Treasury Department
explained:
You are empowering shareholders with the ability to have stronger
oversight. You are forcing the company to think more seriously
about what they do, how it will be perceived and not just to go on
automatic pilot doing practices that are not defensible simply because of their peer group is doing it. 10 8

Opponents argued that say on pay would cause government to
intrude in the boardroom, 10 9 put executive compensation in the
"hands of government bureaucrats,"' 11 0 and upset the traditional distribution of power between boards and shareholders."' They argued
that say on pay would make it harder for companies, particularly those
112
in financial sector, to hire and retain "the best and the brightest"
and that smaller companies would find reporting their pay plans and
giving shareholders a vote to be prohibitively expensive. 113 Opponents also argued that say on pay would lead to activist shareholders
favoring a narrow range of compensation programs, pushing U.S.
1 14
public companies to adopt "one-size-fits-all" compensation plans.
In short, the legislative supporters predicted mandatory say on pay
would impose costs exceeding any benefits.
The debate in Congress thus mirrored-and in some cases went
beyond-the academic debate. Congressional supporters anticipated
a change for the better in the balance of power between shareholders
and managers, as improved shareholder oversight would limit excessive risk taking, reduce the CEO-pay spiral, and link pay to performance. Congressional opponents anticipated a change for the worse in
the balance of power, as shareholders would limit the board's compensation flexibility, impose unnecessary costs on small business, and
make executive hiring more difficult.
108

Id. at 38 (statement of Gene Sperling, Counselor to the Sec'y of the Treasury, U.S.

Dep't of Treasury).
Id. at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus).
109
110 Id. at 9 (statement of Rep. Scott Garrett); id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Spencer
Bachus) (arguing that the government should not mandate private compensation
policies).
11
Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Michael Castle) (pointing out that stockholders have the
right to change directors); id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Jeb Hensarling) (arguing that executive pay is probably a "nonexistent problem," but shareholders should vote for new
management).
112 Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Judy Biggert).
113
Id. at 32 (statements of Rep. Scott Garrett and Scott G. Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) (suggesting larger firms could more easily bear costs
of say-on-pay votes than smaller firms, which "do a better job of aligning risk and rewards").
114
Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 1810.
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III
PRE-DODD-FRANK:

SHAREHOLDER VOTING ON

ExEcuTvE

PAY

In this Part, we analyze the pre-Dodd-Frank data on shareholder
and management proposals on executive pay issues. This includes
proposals submitted by shareholders using Rule 14a-8, which touch on
a broad range of pay practices including say on pay, as well as recent
management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals. Our data set includes
all such proposals from 2003 to 2010.115 At present, we are unable to
analyze data from the most recent year that covers the introduction of
mandatory say-on-pay votes because the data was not yet available at
the time we wrote this Article.
A.

Proposal Frequency and Shareholder Support
1. Mixed Support for Shareholder-SponsoredProposals on Executive
Pay (Other Than Say on Pay)

We begin by using voting data for 2003-2010116 to examine
pre-Dodd-Frank shareholder voting patterns "for" and "against"
shareholder-sponsored resolutions on executive pay under Rule 14a8.117 In Table 1, we divide these shareholder proposals into seven
categories:
(1) reports on executive pay,
(2) increased disclosure of executive pay,
(3) shareholder approval of executive pay (excluding say-on-pay
proposals),
(4) caps on executive pay,
(5) links of executive pay to corporate performance,
(6) reductions of executive pay, and
(7) restrictions and limitations on executive pay.

115

The data were supplied by ISS Corporate Governance Services, a subsidiary of

MSCI Inc. See About ISS, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/about (last visited Mar. 19,
2012). We note that the annual data run fromJuly to June of the following year. In other
words, the 2003 data are collected from July 2003 to June 2004.
116
Each year corresponds to one proxy season. For example, 2010 data is collected
for the time period from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010 so that it covers the 2010 proxy
season (which runs from January to June 2010).
117
Most shares of U.S. public companies are held by institutional investors. MATrEO
TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BD., THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT
REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 27 tbl.13 (2010).
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TABLE 1: SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS ON EXEcUTIVE PAY
(NUMBER AND PERCENT SUPPORT)

Report

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Majority

16
(11.2%)

5
(10.3%)

25
(8.4%)
1
(5.5%)
14
(55.4%)
9
(10.2%)
35
(29.6%)
7
(12.0%)

3
(9.0%)
9
(27.4%)
15
(41.4%)
6
(10.7%)
37
(32.5%)
11
(23.2%)
3
(30.1%)

4
(6.9%)
3
(8.0%)
7
(45.8%)
8
(5.2%)
73
(29.8%)
16
(23.0%)
7
(23.1%)

3
(7.6%)
4
(8.3%)
3
(57.3%)
7
(5.4%)
27
(32.3%)
15
(20.2%)

3
(10.2%)
3
(10.8%)
5
(31.9%)
1
(9.2%)
8
(26.0%)
6
(23.9%)
25
(29.1%)

9
(6.2%)
2
(10.2%)
4
(58.3%)
2
(5.1%)
12
(32.5%)
10
(29.1%)
38
(25.8%)

0

Disclose
Approve

16
(56.6%)

Cap
Link

48
(16.6%)
47
(32.6%)

Reduce
Restrict

23
(48.9%)
1
(5.1%)
7
(34.6%)
33
(13.2%)

Support

0
43
0
14
14
0

We employ the same coding system as Thomas and Martin' 1 8 and explain the different categories more fully in the footnote below. 119
Table 1 shows a wide variation in the number and support levels
for the different categories of shareholder proposals that relate to executive pay. 120 Over the eight-year period shown, it is apparent that
shareholder-sponsored 14a-8 proposals-asking boards to compile reports on executive pay, to make additional disclosures about executive
pay, or that try to get boards to cap executive pay levels-were relatively few in number and attracted low levels of average voting support
(often less than 10% of votes cast). 1 1 None of these proposals received majority support from shareholders.
With respect to "report proposals" and "disclose proposals" calling for reports and additional disclosures on executive pay, we think
that there is a straightforward explanation for the lack of shareholder
118
1073.
119

For further discussion of this methodology, see Thomas & Martin, supra note 22, at
We define each category as follows:
" Report: Seeks a committee report that reviews executive compensation
practices (such as pay disparities);
* Disclose: Seeks additional information about compensation levels (such
as employees whose base salary exceeds $100,000);
" Approve: Seeks shareholder approval of certain pay practices (other

than say on pay) such as retirement plans or severance payments);
*

120
121

Cap: Requests board to limit executive pay (such as dollar caps or limits
in shareholder-approved plan);
" Link: Requests board to tie executive pay to performance (such as pay
linked to total shareholder returns);
" Reduce: Seeks discontinuance of certain pay practices (such as stock options, tax gross-ups, clawbacks);
" Restrict: Seeks to limit total pay of top executives (such as, no bonuses,
no golden parachutes, impose stock holding period).
See supra Table 1.
Id.
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support: shareholders already receive voluminous disclosures about
the levels and composition of pay for the top five executives at public
companies and so they do not see the need for more information or
reports from the company. The tepid shareholder support for pay
caps are more interesting, though they suggest that shareholders are
not too concerned about overall pay levels. These data are consistent
with the claim that shareholders did not view overall pay levels as a
real problem during the 2003-2010 time period, or alternatively, that
if shareholders believed pay levels were a problem, they did not think
that boards were likely to lower them voluntarily.
A second set of proposals-relating to linking, reducing, and restricting executive pay-were more numerous and received stronger
levels of shareholder support, ranging from approximately 15% to
30% of votes cast. 122 Link proposals generally ask boards to tie executive pay levels to firm performance measures, such as total shareholder returns. Some of these proposals attracted majority support.
While shareholders generally seemed to agree on the importance of
pay for performance, we note that almost all U.S. companies already
have some portion of their executives' pay in the form of pay for performance, most commonly stock options or restricted stock. 123 These
proposals were seeking to alter existing payments in particular ways,
such as adding performance hurdles or changing the performance
metric. Given the widespread divergence of opinions about the appropriate form for pay for performance, 24 it is not surprising that
shareholders might hold views different from management on the appropriate pay-for-performance method. This could explain both the
level of interest in the topic (the number of proposals) as well as the
greater shareholder support for proposals seeking to have boards
make such changes.
"Reduce proposals" typically ask the board to discontinue using
certain types of executive pay mechanisms, such as golden parachutes,
tax gross-ups, and others. These proposals have become much less
numerous in recent years, although they have continued to attract
reasonable levels of shareholder support and, in the 2003-2010 period, fourteen of them obtained majority support. 12 5 Taking the example of golden parachutes and tax gross-ups on change-of-control
severance payments, we begin by noting that these agreements are
quite common at U.S. public companies. 126 There has been a wide
122 Id.
123 See Core, Guay & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1172 (explaining that "pay for performance is provided primarily through executive stock and option holdings").
124 See id. at 1177-79 (discussing some of these differences).
125 See supra Table 1.
126 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives BargainFor?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 231, 263 (2006).
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spectrum of views about whether golden parachutes and tax gross-ups
constitute value-maximizing corporate agreements or are just director-sponsored giveaways to top executives. 127 The decline of the hostile takeover over the past decade has likely reduced the salience of
these payments for many investors, perhaps explaining the decline in
the number of such proposals. As with "link proposals," we believe it
likely that shareholders have been of two minds about reduce proposals that seek to eliminate these pay arrangements, and in the end prefer to let the board of directors determine for itself whether to do so.
"Restrict proposals" have become much more popular in the last
few years and during the 2003-2010 period attracted 25% to 30% support on average. 128 They seek to restrict certain pay practices, such as
imposing holding periods on restricted stock payments. Given the
overall shift toward the use of restricted stock in lieu of stock options
that has occurred over the past several years, 129 it makes sense that
shareholder attention would focus on the length of the holding period for these shares. There is, however, no consensus on what constitutes the optimal holding period for restricted stock, and reasonable
shareholders could differ on the question.1 30 Hence, this determination is likely to depend on the particular circumstances of each individual corporation and its executives-a notion which, in the eyes of
some shareholders, will make the board of directors the best-informed
decision makers on the question. This may explain the moderate support levels that we observe in the data.
"Approve proposals," the last group of shareholder proposals
shown in Table 1, request the board to submit certain pay practices
for shareholder approval, including the use of Supplemental Employee Retirement Plans (SERPs), as well as other retirement plans or
severance payments (they do not include say-on-pay votes, which we
analyze separately in Table 2 below). What is striking about approve
proposals is the relatively high levels of shareholder support they re-

127 Compare Judith C. Machlin, Hyuk Choe & James A. Miles, The Effects of Golden
Parachutes on Takeover Activity, 36 J.L. & ECON. 861, 875 (1993) (finding that golden
parachutes increase the likelihood of a takeover but not the premium paid, and that they
do not appear to incentivize managers to accept lowball bids), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design ofExecutive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 836 (2002) ("[T]he practice of making [gratuitous] payments [to managers] is an indication that managers use their power to extract
rents.").
128 See supra Table 1.
129 Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ExEcUrIV PAY, supra note 1 (manuscript at 46).
130
See Core, Guay & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1179-81 (explaining that although
shareholders may view a CEO who exercises options or sells his stock as unwinding his
incentives, it is sometimes optimal for a CEO to sell equity).
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ceived in the pre-Dodd-Frank period, including majority support for
43 of them.1 31
Approve proposals are an important category from our perspective as they are the closest in nature to the say-on-pay proposals mandated by Dodd-Frank. There are some important differences though.
First, these proposals were only made at a small subset of public companies, presumably ones where activist shareholders believed that they
had an especially strong case for seeking shareholder support. Second, they targeted specific, less popular payment practices, such as
SERPs, rather than the publicly disclosed overall pay packages of top
executives. Third, they are made by self-selected shareholders, rather
than management, and some investors may be skeptical of the motivations of the individual or group making the proposals. 32 For all of
these reasons, we would not expect that the success (or failure) of
these proposals would translate directly into a similar fate for management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals.
With all of those qualifications, the difference in the level of
shareholder support for this category of proposals is striking. It is apparent that shareholders hold, at least for the subset of firms where
the proposals were submitted, a strong, although generally minority
view that boards should give shareholders more input into pay
practices.
2.

Strong Support for Shareholder-SponsoredSay-on-Pay Proposals

Table 2 shows the pre-Dodd-Frank experience of say-on-pay
shareholder-sponsored proposals using Rule 14a-8 (Panel A) and
management-sponsored proposals (Panel B). 13 3 Panel A shows that
shareholders started making these proposals in 2006 and that the
number of them increased steadily until 2010 when there was a slight
decline, perhaps in anticipation of the effect of Dodd-Frank's mandate or perhaps because of the increased number of managementsponsored say-on-pay proposals that were either voluntary or those required by receipt of TARP funds. Panel B shows that managementsponsored proposals seeking advisory shareholder approval of executive pay began to show up a bit later and did not really take off until
2009 when TARP firms were required to do so.
It is important to note that the shareholder support column has a
different interpretation for the shareholder-sponsored proposals and
the management-sponsored proposals. For shareholder-sponsored
131
132

See supra Table 1.
This may be particularly true for certain gadfly investors or labor groups that are

involved in disputes with the targeted firms. For a discussion of the issues arising out of
labor shareholder activism, see Schwab & Thomas, supra note 76.
133
See infra Table 2.
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proposals, the percentage of votes cast in favor of the proposal are
votes asking management to permit shareholders to approve executive pay for the five named individual executives. A support level below 50% therefore should be interpreted as meaning that less than a
majority of the total votes cast are in favor of such an advisory vote. By
comparison, a management-sponsored proposal receiving majority
support indicates that a majority of the votes cast approved of the particular pay packages in consideration.
2: SAY-ON-PAY PROPOSALS PRE-DODD-FRANK
(NUMBER, SUPPORT, AND MAJORITY SUPPORT)

TABLE

Panel A-Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals

Year

Number of
Say-on-Pay
14a-8 Proposals

Shareholder
Support (% "For")

Number Receiving
Majority Support

0
42.5%
5
2006
7
37.5%*"
52
2007
8
71
38.1%***
2008
41.1%""
21
2009
61
9
40.3%
2010
48
...
Represents a test of the difference of the mean of the percentage of shares voted in
favor of say-on-pay vote by year between shareholder and management proposals at
the 1% level in a two-tailed test.
Panel B-Management-Sponsored Proposals
Number of
Number Receiving
Shareholder
Say-on-Pay
Support (% "For")
Majority Support
Year
Proposals
0
0
0
2006
2
98.2%***
2
2007
8
89.2%""
8
2008
152
87.6%***
2009
152
143
88.7%*'*
146
2010
Represents a test of the difference of the mean of the percentage of shares voted in
favor of say-on-pay vote by year between shareholder and management proposals at
the 1% level ina two-tailed test.

Turning to the results, we see that shareholder-sponsored proposals attract significant support, even majority support in some cases.
Since shareholder activists select the companies at which they submit
executive pay proposals, and have in the past targeted companies with
either relatively poor performance, 1 3 4 "excess" executive pay,' 3 5 or
both, we would expect that these proposals would attract relatively
high levels of shareholder support-and they do. Overall voting support levels have consistently hovered around 40% over the entire time
period, with a sharp spike in the number of proposals receiving major134
135

Thomas & Martin, supra note 22,' at 1021.
Ertimur, Ferri & Muslu, supra note 23, at 34.

2012]

DODD-FRANK'S SAY ON PAY

1243

ity approval in 2009, prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank.1 3 6 As we
will see in Table 3, both of these are quite similar with those for shareholder-sponsored approve proposals.
Management-sponsored proposals asking for advisory shareholder approval of top executive pay packages appear to be very different. Overall shareholder support for these proposals is extremely
high-around 90% for 2008, 2009, and 2010-and only a small handful-three in 2010-did not receive majority support by shareholders.' 3 7 The differences between the management and shareholder
proposal support levels are statistically significant at the 1% level using
year-by-year comparisons.
There is the possibility that self-selection effects are present for
the management-sponsored proposals because, other than financial
institutions that were required to put these proposals on their ballot,
management voluntarily added these proposals to the ballot. While
there may be a host of motivations for doing so, companies that have
good investor relations and that do not anticipate significant investor
dissent over pay practices might be more likely to make such proposals. An alternative explanation is that these are mostly firms with
"bad" compensation practices that were getting shareholder pressure
to put them on the ballot. In either event, it is striking how little
shareholder discontent these vote totals reflect.
In Table 3, we aggregate all of the data contained in Tables 1 and
2 to present a broader overall picture of pre-Dodd-Frank shareholder
voting outcomes.' 3 8 Looking first at the average voting percentages,
management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals attract the highest levels
of support by far-more than twice as high as any of the shareholdersponsored proposals. 139 Amongst the shareholder-sponsored proposals, approve proposals and say-on-pay proposals-both of which request a shareholder vote on executive pay matters-are the two
categories that receive the highest shareholder support by a wide
margin.140
Looking at which proposals are most likely to attract majority
shareholder support, management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals receive by far the greatest percentage support.' 4 ' Of the shareholdersponsored proposals, approve proposals receive the highest support,
followed by shareholder-sponsored say-on-pay proposals, with reduce
proposals and link proposals in the single-digit percentages. Based on
See supra Table 2.
Id.
138
See infra Table 3.
139 Id.
140
Id.
141
The differences between shareholder support levels for shareholder-sponsored and
management-sponsored say-on-pay levels are significant at the 1% level.
136

1'7
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this evidence, we would project that management-sponsored say on
pay after Dodd-Frank would be likely to attract high levels of shareholder support and that only a relatively small fraction of such proposals would likely fail to attract majority support.
TABLE

3: PRE-DoDD-FRANK EXECUTIVE PAY PROPOSALS

Type of proposal
Shareholder-Sponsored
Report
Disclose
Approve
Cap
Link
Reduce
Restrict
Say on Pay

Number of
Proposals

Percentage
"For" Vote

Majority
Support

68

8.9%

0.0%

22
87
34
247
145
73
282

16.5%
49.6%
7.6%
28.0%
23.5%
26.8%
42.0%***

0.0%
49.43%
0.0%
5.7%
9.7%
0.0%
16.0%

308

88.2%-

99.0%

Management-Sponsored
Say on Pay

Represents a test of the difference of the mean of the percentage of shares voted in
favor of say-on-pay vote between shareholder- and management-sponsored proposals
at the 1% level in a two-tailed test.

B.

Effect of ISS Voting Recommendations

Having looked at the overall voting trends on shareholder executive pay proposals, we turn next to measuring how shareholder voting
correlates with management and ISS recommendations. Table 4
breaks out the differential effects of ISS and management voting recommendations. 142 Several interesting patterns appear from the data.
First, management rarely recommends that shareholders vote for a
shareholder proposal related to executive pay: only five times out of a
total of 1,240 shareholder proposals (0.40%) made from 2003 to 2010
on the topic.

143

In four of the five instances, these proposals garnered

majority support, while in the fifth case ISS recommended against the
proposal. 144
Second, for management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals, ISS recommended in favor of the proposal in 234 of the 303 cases, or 77.2%
of the time. 145 These proposals obtained 92.4% voting support from
shareholders. However, in the remaining 69 cases where ISS recommended shareholders vote against a company's executive pay arrangements, shareholder voting support dropped to 73.4%, or an average
decrease of 19.0% of the votes cast. Thus, withdrawal of ISS support
142

See infra Table 4.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id.
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for a management-sponsored proposal was associated with some, but
not a decisive, drop in shareholder voting support.
Turning to shareholder-sponsored proposals, ISS generally recommended against proposals in the report, disclose, cap and reduce
categories. For approve, link, restrict and shareholder-sponsored sayon-pay proposals, ISS overwhelmingly recommended "for" votes. In
all of the shareholder-sponsored proposal categories, a negative ISS
recommendation was associated with a lower shareholder support percentage. The effect is close to or above 20% of total voting percentages for the six categories: disclose, approve, link, reduce, restrict and
shareholder-sponsored say on pay.
Collectively, these data suggest that in the pre-Dodd-Frank period, ISS "for" voting recommendations on most categories of advisory
executive pay proposals were associated with about a 20% impact on
shareholder support for the proposal. This seems to be consistently
true for management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals as well as most
categories of shareholder-sponsored proposals. However, as we show
next, these results may overstate the effect of an ISS voting recommendation on shareholder voting.
TABLE

4:

PRE-DODD-FRANK MANAGEMENT AND

ISS

RECOMMENDATIONS

(NUMBER AND PERCENT SUPPORT)
ISS and
Management
"For"
Recommendation

Management
Only "For"
Recommendation

ISS Only "For"
Recommendation

ISS and
Management
"Against"
Recommendation

1
(15.5%)
5
(41.7%)
79
(50.3%)
1
(24.7%)
156
(35.5%)
53
(43.1%)
70
(27.6%)
273
(42.0%)

66
(8.6%)
17
(9.0%)
6
(28.2%)
33
(7.1%)
89
(14.1%)
88
(10.4%)
3
(8.3%)
2
(12.7%)

0

0

Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals
1
(24.5%)
0

Report

0

Disclose

0

Approve

2
(84.4%)
0

0

0

Reduce

1
(91.3%)
0

Restrict

0

0

1
(51.8%)

0

Cap
Link

Say on Pay

0

0

Management-Sponsored Proposals
Say on Pay

234

69

(92.4%)

(73.4%)

To get a deeper insight into how shareholder voting correlates
with management and ISS recommendations, we applied a methodol-
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ogy that we developed in an earlier article. 146 This technique allowed
us to isolate ISS voting recommendations from management recommendations and thereby calculate an upper limit on the correlation of
shareholder voting with ISS voting recommendations. We summarize
147
this procedure briefly below.
To identify the extent to which shareholder voting has been influenced by ISS, we first compiled a matrix for different categories of
proposals, showing management and ISS recommendations on various proposals and how shareholders had voted on those proposals.
The two-by-three matrix, which we created by matching for-or-against
recommendations by ISS with for-or-against recommendations by
management, showed for each cell the number of proposals
presented for shareholder vote and the percentage of favorable share148
holder votes on the proposals.
FIGURE

1:

Proposal Category

For
Against

PROPOSAL MATRIX

Management
For

Against

(A)
(C)

(B)

Other

(D)

Looking at the matrix, we then sought to identify the extent to
which shareholder voting was consistent with management and ISS
recommendations. We focused on cells, (A)-(D), where management and ISS had actually given recommendations on proposals (either for or against), and disregarded the relatively few cases where
management made some other statement about the proposal. We
were unable to test for "causation"-that is, whether recommendations actually influenced voting behavior or simply anticipated existing voting preferences.
In evaluating these results, it is not enough to simply notice, for
example, that in cell (A) shareholder voting tended to be favorable
when both management and ISS were for the proposals, since any unfavorable votes in cell (A) indicated shareholders were voting contrary
to both management and ISS recommendations. To capture the extent to which shareholders were voting consistently with management
and ISS recommendations, we looked at all the permutations to iden146
See generally Jales Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations
and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals,55 VILL. L. Rav. 1 (2010) (analyzing mutual fund
voting data from 2003 to 2008).
147
For greater detail on our methodology, see id. at 46-52.
148
See id. at 46.
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tify the proportion of shareholder voting decisions that were consistent or inconsistent with management and ISS recommendations,
breaking down shareholder voting into four categories:
(1) Voting that was consistent with both management and ISS recommendations-"for" votes in cell (A) and "against" votes in
cell (D);
(2) Voting that was consistent with only management, but not ISS,
recommendations-"against" votes in cell (B) and "for" votes in
cell (C);
(3) Voting that was consistent with only ISS, but not management,
recommendaions-"for" votes in cell (B) and "against" votes in
cell (C); and
(4) Voting that was consistent with neitherISS nor management recommendations-"against" votes in cell (A) and "for" votes in
cell (D).
In this way, we identified how often shareholders voted consistently with joint recommendations by management and ISS, management-only recommendations, ISS-only recommendations, and the
shareholder's own determination. The first row reports the results for
all management say-on-pay proposals, while the second row reports
1 49
them for shareholder say-on-pay proposals.
TABLE 5: EFFECT OF MANAGEMENT AND

ISS

RECOMMENDATIONS ON

VOTING ON SAY-ON-PAY PROPOSALS

Type of Say-on-Pay

Mgmt.

Proposal

Both

Only

ISS Only

Neither

Total

Management-Sponsored
Shareholder-Sponsored

71.4%
0.8%

16.7%
57.3%

6.1%
41.6%

5.9%
0.3%

100.0%
100.0%

For management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals, what is striking
is that shareholders are more than twice as likely to follow management's recommendation than they are ISS's recommendation when
the two recommendations differ. In fact, for management-sponsored
proposals, shareholders are almost as likely to vote following their own
counsel (5.9%) as they are to follow ISS when ISS's recommendation
differs from management's recommendation (6.1%). Both of these
results make clear that for management-sponsored proposals, ISS has
less impact than might seem to be the case from the raw data
presented in Table 4.
With shareholder-sponsored say-on-pay proposals, however, the
ISS effect is much stronger. Remembering that management almost
The reader is reminded that shareholder-submitted say-on-pay proposals ask the
board of directors to permit shareholders to hold advisory votes, whereas managementsubmitted say-on-pay proposals are the votes on whether or not to approve the pay
149

package.
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never issues a "for" recommendation on these proposals, virtually all
shareholder support for these proposals are in accordance with a positive ISS voting recommendation.
IV
P6ST-DODD-FRANK: FIRST YEAR OF SAY ON PAY

Although we are currently unable to analyze the results of the
first year of say-on-pay votes under Dodd-Frank because of delays in
getting the data, it is apparent from academic and practitioner commentary that the say-on-pay mandate produced a mixed set of results.
Many of the concerns skeptics had expressed about say on pay did not
materialize. For example, shareholders proved not to be indifferent
150
about say on pay and did not blindly follow ISS recommendations.
Likewise, some supporters did not realize their hopes. For example,
failed say-on-pay votes were rare, and while some companies made adjustments to their pay programs, there was no rush to undertake
15
broad changes in executive pay practices. '
A. Shareholder Voting on Say-on-Pay Proposals
In the 2011 proxy season, the inaugural year for the Dodd-Frank
say-on-pay mandate, shareholders voted on say-on-pay proposals submitted by management at about 2,200 U.S. public companies. 152 A
brief summary of the highlights of these votes from a report prepared
by ISS shows that:
* Shareholders showed strong support for existing pay practices, with say-on-pay votes garnering on average 91.2%
15 3
support.
" Say-on-pay proposals were voted down only 1.6% of the time
(at 37 of the Russell 3000 companies subject to say-on-pay
150 See Robin Ferracone, Say on Pay in 2011, and What to Expect for 2012, -lHARv.Bus. REv.
BLOG NETwoRu (Oct. 3, 2011, 9:30 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/10/what was-be
hind those-say-on-p.html (concluding that investors used ISS recommendations only as
guidance).
151 See Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 6, at 289; see also Say On Pay Makes Its Debut in the
2011 Proxy Season, COOLEY LLP (July 28, 2011), http://www.cooley.com/65339 (noting that
"the anticipated widespread stockholder challenge to perceived out-of-line pay packages
did not materialize" and that out of 2,500 companies that have disclosed results, "less than
2% have reported failed say-on-pay votes").
152

Compare TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S.

POSTSEASON REPORT 2 (2011) [hereinafter ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT], with An Analysis of
Voting Results and Performance at Russell 3000 Companies, EQuiLAR (2011), http://www.

equilar.com/knowledge-network/research-articles/2011/pdf/Equilar-Voting-Analytics-July
2011.pdf (counting 2,252 say-on-pay proposals from the Russell 3000 as of June 30, 2011).
153
See ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 1.
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votes), 1 54 apparently mostly based on pay-for-performance
1 55
concerns.
* Overall, say-on-pay votes were highly correlated to company
share returns and CEO pay, with low returns and high CEO
156
pay resulting in lower say-on-pay support.
" Companies with "layered" disclosure of their pay practicesthat is, executive summaries of their pay practices, along with
157
regular disclosure-received more say-on-pay support.
*

Negative say-on-pay recommendations by ISS prompted many
companies to modify their disclosure filings or to change their
1 58
pay practices (sometimes retroactively) to win support.

In addition, shareholders showed a clear preference for companies holding an annual say-on-pay vote, with shareholders at 1,792
companies supporting (by majority or plurality vote) annual votes,
compared to a preference of triennial voting at only 412 companies. 159 Despite management recommendations for triennial voting
at 978 companies, a majority of shareholders voted in favor of annual
voting at 564 of these companies.1 60 In other words, say on pay
promises to be an annual event at most larger public companies. We
explore these findings more below.
1.

Strong Shareholder Support for Say-on-Pay Proposals

During the 2011 proxy season (between January 21 and June 30,
2011), shareholder support for management-sponsored say-on-pay res16
olutions averaged 91.2% for all companies holding such a vote. 1
154
The Russell 3000 is an index that represents the 3,000 largest U.S. public companies by market capitalization, which comprise 98% of the U.S. public equity market. Russell
3000 Index, RUSSELL, http://www.russell.com/indexes/data/fact-shees/us/russell_3000_
index.asp (last updated Mar. 31, 2012).
155
See ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 1.
156
Id. at 3.
157 Id. at 2.
158
Id. at 1.
159
Id. at 4. The same pattern was observed at the first 100 filers among the Fortune
500, where shareholders at 92 of the companies gave majority support for annual say-onpay votes-even though management had recommended annual voting at only 61 of these
companies. Russell Miller & Yonat Assayag, SOP Drives Compensation Program Changes to
Enhance Pay/PerformanceLink, DIRECTOR NOTES (Conference Bd.), Sept. 2011, at 6, http://
clearbridgecomp.com/wp-content/uploads/TCBDN-V3NI8-11.pdf.
Of the remaining
eight companies-where shareholders mostly supported triennial votes-four of the companies are family controlled. Id.
160
ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 4. Management recommendations for
biennial voting fared even worse, with shareholders supporting annual voting at 43 of the
59 companies where management had recommended biennial voting. Id.
161
Id. at 2; see also Miller & Assayag, supra note 159, at 3 (reporting that 2,704 companies had held say-on-pay votes as of September 3, 2011).

1250

[Vol. 97:1213

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

This was almost identical to average support for TARP-funded firms in
162
the 2010 proxy season.
Overall, most companies received strong support for their say-onpay votes, with 71% of companies receiving over 90% shareholder support, 23% receiving 70-90% support, and 6% receiving 50-70% support. The following table from Equilar illustrates the strong
163
shareholder say-on-pay support:

FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES AccORDING TO THEIR SAY-ONPAY APPROVAL RATES
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The Conference Board identified similar results. As of July 2011,
they found that failed say-on-pay votes occurred at only 36-or 1.6%of the 2,225 Russell 3000 companies holding a say-on-pay vote in
201 1.64 This percentage was similar to, though a bit higher than, the

percentage of failed votes in 2010 among companies that held voluntary or TARP-mandated say-on-pay votes. 16 5 As our data show, in 2010,
failed votes occurred at only three companies-or 2.0%-of the 146
companies holding a say-on-pay vote.
Despite the strong support shareholders gave to most companies'
executive pay packages, there have been questions whether shareholders were adequately attentive to pay levels and design. The Council of
162
See Michael Littenberg, Farzad Damania & Justin Neidig, A Closer Look at Negative
Say-on-Pay Votes During the 2011 Proxy Season, DmEcroir NOTES (Conference Bd.), July 2011,
at 2, http://www.srz.com/A-Closer-Look-at-Negative-Say-on-Pay-Votes-During-the-2011Proxy-Season-07-26-2011/ (follow "View PDF" hyperlink). The Conference Board report
was adapted from a study by Schulte, Roth & Zabel LLP. Noam Noked, The Votes are InDeconstructingthe 2011 Say on Pay Vote, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE

&

FIN. REG.

(July 29, 2011, 9:09 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/07/29/the-votesare-in-%E2%80%94-deconstructing-the-2011-say-on-pay-vote/
(posting of material prepared by Michael R. Littenberg, partner at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP).
163
See ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 1.
164
Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162.
165
Id.
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Institutional Investors interviewed shareholders that had voted against
say-on-pay proposals, and learned that some shareholders felt that investors generally were "still blindly following board/management recommendations," were "too soft [in evaluating pay programs]," and
were too often swayed in their votes by "who the companies' investors
are, not necessarily the quality of their program." 6 6
2.

Negative Votes Related to Pay-for-PerformanceConcerns

Thirty-seven companies failed to receive majority support for
their executive pay packages. 167 Smaller companies were as likely as
larger companies to receive an unfavorable say-on-pay vote-with 8 of
the 37 companies on the S&P 500 (representing 1.6% of such larger
companies) and 29 outside the S&P 500 (representing 1.6% of such
smaller companies).168

In looking at the failed votes, both ISS and the Conference Board
identified pay-for-performance issues as the principal reason for the
negative shareholder vote. 169 For example, about half of the companies with failed say-on-pay votes had reported negative double-digit
three-year total share returns.170 Other pay issues-such as tax grossand
ups, discretionary bonuses, inappropriate peer benchmarking,
71
unpopular pay committee members-were also mentioned.1
In fact, for nearly every company where say on pay failed to get
majority support, there was a company-specific story of shareholder
discontent, particularly involving the disconnect between pay and performance at the company:
166

Robin Ferracone & Dayna Harris, Say on Pay: Identifying Investor Concerns, COUNCIL

OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 16 (Sept. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/publications/Say
%200n%2OPay%20-%20Identifying%20Investor%2OConcerns.pdf.
167 Id. at 2. Two of the companies (Cutera and Dex One) have since left the Russell
3000 index. In addition, two companies (Cooper Industries and Doral Financial) failed to
get majority support for their say-on-pay proposals if abstentions are included, though
these were not included in the lists compiled by the ISS and the Conference Board. See ISS
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 2-3.
168
See ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 3. Nor did failed say-on-pay votes
track market capitalization, with failed votes proportional to the number of companies in
different market capitalization ranges. Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 3
(finding that 17 failed votes occurred at companies with less than $1 billion in market cap,
I I at companies with $1-$5 billion in market cap, and eight at companies with greater
than $5 billion in market cap-correlating with the number of companies in each
segment).
169
ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 3 ("[P] ay-for-performance concerns...
were identified [as the primary driver] at 27 companies."). For example, shareholders at
Constellation Energy gave only 38.6% support for the company pay practices, which included an increase in CEO pay from $6.7 million in 2009 to nearly $16 million in 2010,
despite one-year and three-year share returns of negative 10.3% and negative 30.6%.
Id.
170
171
Id. For other factors that contributed to a negative shareholder vote, see Ferracone
& Harris, supra note 166, at 2.
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Stanley Black & Decker (outsized time-based and guaranteed equity
award, and failure to address low voting support for two compensation committee members in 2010); Nabors Industries (pay-for-performance concerns, coupled with pay significantly above the peer
median); Hewlett-Packard (concerns over the new CEO's hire package in conjunction with a track record of generous severance payments for departing executives, and the CEO's participation in
selecting new board members); Janus Capital Group (outsized signon bonus for the new CEO, despite lagging shareholder returns);
Jacobs Engineering Group (pay-for-performance concerns); and
Masco (pay-for-performance).172
Pay-for-performance issues-and not other questions of pay design-seemed to have been dominant on the minds of shareholders.
The Conference Board study on the first 100 filers found that factors
other than the pay-performance relationship seemed mostly irrelevant in shareholder votes. At the studied companies, say-on-pay votes
did not vary based on such pay practices as excise tax gross-ups, perquisites, stock ownership guidelines, and clawbacks.
For example, companies that offered executives an excise tax
gross-up received about the same say-on-pay support (92%) as companies without such a practice (89%). Likewise, companies with disclosed clawback policies received as much say-on-pay support (89%)
as companies without such policies (86%). Nonetheless, when combined with pay-performance concerns, the practices may have swung
some votes. For example, the couple of companies among the first
100 filers that added perquisites received much less say-on-pay support
(68%) than the ten companies that eliminated or reduced perquisites
(93%).173
A study of failed say-on-pay votes prepared for the Council of Institutional Investors confirmed
the importance of the
pay-performance relationship. 174 The study-based on interviews
with institutional investors, investment-management firms, proxy advisers and solicitors, and company officials-identified "pay for performance" disconnects as the reason for the failed vote 92% of the
17 5
time.
One-year and three-year total shareholder returns (TSRs) were a
strong predictor of say-on-pay voting-with strong TSRs resulting in
high levels of shareholder support and weak TSRs resulting in low
172

173

ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 3.

Miller & Assayag, supra note 159, at 5.
Ferracone & Harris, supra note 166, at 1.
175
Other reasons cited were "poor pay practices" (cited 57% of the time), perceived
"poor disclosure" by the company (cited 35% of the time), and unreasonably or inappropriately high compensation (cited 16% of the time). Id. at 2.
174
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levels of shareholder support. 1 76 Some have even suggested that say1
on-pay may be more a "say on performance.

77

Equilar compared the voting results on say-on-pay proposals
based on levels of CEO pay and TSR. Companies with one-year TSR
in the highest two quartiles and CEO pay in the lowest quartile received the strongest say-on-pay support-approximately 95.8%. Companies with one-year TSR in the lowest quartile and CEO pay in the
highest quartile received the weakest say-on-pay support-approximately 73.9% .178
TABLE 6: SAY-ON-PAY VOTING RESULTS AMONG FIRST 100 COMPANIES
AND CEO PAY/PERFORMANCE
CEO Total Compensation in 2010

One-Year TSR
QI (Top)
Q2
Q3
Q4

Q4

Q3

Q2

Q1 (Top)

94.1%
97.5%
93.7%
88.2%

90.8%
86.1%
88.0%
82.4%

92.5%
95.5%
82.1%
87.5%

92.2%
84.8%
90.4%
73.9%

Nonetheless, short-term TSR performance-though a key factor
in shareholder voting support-proved not to be outcome determinative. For example, of the many companies receiving 90% or more
shareholder say-on-pay support, about 21% had TSR performance in
the bottom quartile. But the importance of performance results is in179
escapable, as is made clear in the following chart by Equilar:

176 Miller & Assayag, supra note 159, at 4. In fact, the only two companies in the study
not receiving majority support for their pay programs had average one-year TSRs of negative 13.3% and average three-year TSRs of negative 13.0%. This is compared to overall
TSRs for the first 100 filers of average one-year TSRs of positive 16.5% and three-year TSRs
of negative 4.6%.
177
SeeJoseph E. Bachelder III, Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank, HARv.L. ScH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE

& FIN. REG.

(Sept. 17,

2011, 8:19 AM),

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/

corpgov/2011/09/17/say-on-pay-under-dodd-frank.
178 Miller & Assayag, supra note 159, at 4 (reporting figures from ClearBridge Compensation Group, which identified average percentage of shareholders voting for the executive compensation program).
179

ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 3.
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FIGURE

3:

DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY PERFORMANCE AND LEVELS
OF SAY-ON-PAY SUPPORT
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More relevant than overall levels of CEO pay may have been increases in CEO pay. One-year growth in pay is a factor used by proxy
advisory firms in analyzing pay practices, making companies with
above-average CEO pay increases more susceptible to negative votes
than those with below-average CEO pay increases. The following table
80
produced by Equilar makes this clear:'
FIGURE
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Miller & Assayag, supra note 159, at 5.

80% 89%

90% 100%

DODD-FRANK'S SAY ON PAY

20121

1255

This correlation was particularly pronounced for companies with
failed say-on-pay votes. At 27 of the 37 such companies, TSR had been
negative and CEO pay had increased in the prior year. 181 In short,
shareholders showed their displeasure that executives should win big
while shareholders lost big.
In sum, shareholders focused on "outlier" companies with high
overall pay, low total shareholder return compared to their industry
or peers, or both. This suggests that say on pay may play an important
role in helping to discipline pay practices at some firms where they
vary significantly from those observed elsewhere.
3.

ISS Recommendations Not Followed Reflexively

Despite predictions that shareholders (especially institutional
shareholders) would reflexively follow ISS recommendations regarding say-on-pay proposals, failed say-on-pay votes were far fewer than
had been recommended by ISS.182 While ISS recommended negative
say-on-pay votes at 285 companies (13% of the companies it reviewed), only 37 companies-or 1.6%-conducting a say-on-pay vote
183
failed to receive majority shareholder support.
More than 86% of the companies that ISS targeted with an
"against" recommendation received majority support for their say-onpay proposal.' 8 4 But even though ISS did not carry the day at most
companies it targeted with an "against" recommendation, all the companies with a failed say-on-pay vote were on the ISS target list. In addition, say-on-pay support at companies on the ISS target list was only
71.8%-on average 25% lower than for companies receiving a
is consistent with our
favorable ISS recommendation' 815-which
pre-Dodd-Frank findings in Table 4, as management would always
have recommended that shareholders vote in favor of their proposal.
The 2011 ISS proxy-voting guidelines were essentially unchanged
from those of 2010 on the issue of management say-on-pay propos181

Id. at 4.

Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 4.
See id. at 3 (identifying ISS "against" recommendations at 276 companies and "for"
recommendations at 1,949 companies). The rate of negative say-on-pay voting recommendations by Glass Lewis, the other major proxy advisory firm, apparently was similar to that
of ISS. SeeJames D.C. Barrall & Alice M. Chung, Say on Pay in the 2011 Proxy Season: Lessons
Learned and Coming Attractionsfor U.S. Public Companies, DIRECTOR NOTES (Conference Bd.),
July 2011, at 5, http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4251-.pdf (noting
that Glass Lewis is less transparent than ISS in disclosing the firm's voting
recommendations).
184
Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 4.
185
Id. at 5. This is in comparison to 42% support at companies with a failed say-on-pay
182

183

vote and 92.9% support for companies receiving a "for" recommendation from ISS. Id.
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als. t 86 ISS based its negative recommendations in the 2011 proxy season mostly on perceived disconnects between pay and performance,
with specific attention to year-over-year increases and long-term trends
in executive pay compared to shareholder returns.18 7 Interestingly,
shareholders seemed indifferent to ISS concerns about non-pay-forperformance policies-such as tax gross-ups, change-in-control definitions, severance pay, and relocation payments. Even though ISS labeled some of these practices as "problematic," shareholders seemed
unmoved. In particular, shareholders seemed unconcerned about
pay practices that ISS felt "could incentivize excessive risk-taking,"
such as guaranteed bonuses and annuity grants, lucrative severance
packages, and disproportionate pensions.'8 8
Nonetheless, shareholders did seem concerned at some companies about the question of board responsiveness to shareholder pay
concerns-one of the factors behind an ISS "against" recommenda-

tion. 189 Although it may be too early to tell, the ways in which management responded during the 2011 proxy season to ISS negative
voting recommendations suggest that management believes this could
be a basis for shareholder voting dissatisfaction in the future.
B.

Impact of Say on Pay

One voting season a trend does not make. Yet, according to
some commentators, the 2011 proxy season was a watershed event in
U.S. corporate governance. The say-on-pay votes mandated by DoddFrank, in these commentators' eyes, appear to have catalyzed greater
management attention to shareholder concerns, an increased shareholder interest in voting on corporate governance, and a broader dialogue on pay issues between management and shareholders (and
proxy advisory firms).1 90 SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar commented
that management is "putting in more performance-based compensa186

ISS

GOVERNANCE SERVS.,

2011 U.S.

PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY

37 (2011),

available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS2011USPolicySummaryGuidelines20
110127.pdf [hereinafter ISS 2011 GUIDELINES]. These guidelines are in line with the five
"global principles" previously identified by ISS in evaluating pay programs: (1) maintaining a pay-for-performance alignment, (2) avoiding "pay for failure," (3) maintaining an
effective compensation committee, (4) providing shareholders clear, comprehensive pay
disclosures, and (5) avoiding "inappropriate" pay for outside directors. Not surprisingly,
the 2011 guidelines no longer mention shareholder-sponsored say-on-pay proposals, as
they are now moot.
187
Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 4.
188 ISS 2011GuIDELINES, supra note 186, at 39.
189
See TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT 30-33 (2011) (describing instances in which lack of responsiveness to prior shareholder opposition to a company's pay policies or compensation committee members

contributed to opposition to board nominees).
190
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner-An Inflection Point:
The SEC and the Current Financial Reform Landscape (June 10, 2011).
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tion plans and they are addressing items that shareholders often criticized, such as: excessive severance; perks; federal income tax
payments; and pensions. For example, approximately 40 of the Fortune 100 companies have eliminated policies that had the company
pay certain tax liabilities of executives."1 91
Going beyond the reasons articulated in support of say on pay
before the enactment of Dodd-Frank, say on pay has been said to: (1)
"bring[ ] greater attention to executive pay policies and practices," (2)
make "shareholders feel more connected with the process of setting
executive pay," and (3) increase the attention by directors and management to whether executive pay is consistent with shareholders'
19 2
views.
One thing that did not happen during the 2011 proxy season,
however, was a shareholder backlash at increasing levels of executive
pay. Despite ISS's intention that say-on-pay proposals be evaluated, in
part, on the basis of whether inappropriate "peer group benchmarking" had led to the ratcheting up of executive pay, the upward spiral
1 93
in CEO pay seemed not to be on the minds of shareholders.
As the dust settles on the inaugural year of Dodd-Frank's say-onpay mandate, advisors to public companies have identified some early
lessons. For example, the process for setting executive pay in public
companies now lives under the shadow of say-on-pay votes. As the
Conference Board advised corporate directors: "[C]ompanies need
to take [the trends and emerging regulatory landscape] into account
as they make compensation and governance decisions in 2011 that will
best position them for the 2012 proxy season and SOP votes to
194
come."
1. Pay Programs Changed in Anticipation of Say on Pay
Even before the say-on-pay vote, management at many companies
made changes to the substance and disclosure of their pay programs.
According to a study by the Conference Board on pay practices at the
100 companies in the Fortune 500 that were first to file their 2011
proxy filings, many of these companies changed the terms of their pay
programs, particularly to more clearly align pay to performance. In
addition, many companies revised the content (and their attitudes)
toward company disclosure of executive pay in the CD&A filed with
the annual meeting proxy materials.
191
192
193

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Bachelder, supra note 177.
See ISS 2011GuIDELINES, supra note 186, at 38 (assessing whether benchmarking is

sound); see also Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 6, at 310-14 (predicting that shareholders
would not recognize increasing CEO pay).
194 Barrall & Chung, supra note 183, at 1.
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In some cases companies changed their executive pay programs-sometimes retroactively-reducing non-performance-based
pay (such as tax gross-ups, executive perquisites, and large severance
arrangements) or enhancing the pay-for-performance relationship. 95
According to the Conference Board, about 46% of the companies in
the study eliminated or reduced non-performance-based pay in anticipation of the 2011 say-on-pay vote.' 9 6 The pay-for-performance relationship was enhanced with changes to company guidelines on CEO
stock ownership (six companies) 19 7 and with revised standards for
"clawbacks" of executive pay after a financial restatement (34
companies) .198
Disclosure of executive pay in 2011 also went through significant
changes, as more companies sought to make their proxy disclosure
not only compliant, but informative and persuasive. Many companies
used the CD&A to tell a clearer story and offer performance-based
rationale for their pay programs. Most companies in the Conference
Board study (65, up from 30 the year before) included executive summaries on their pay-performance relationship, often with graphical
representations. 199 Some companies went one step further and provided "layered" disclosure, with a proxy summary at the beginning of
the proxy statement that highlighted pay decisions and company performance in 2010.200
2. Jaw-Boning in Response to Negative ISS Recommendations
One of the most interesting aspects of the 2011 proxy season was
the give-and-take that occurred at many companies whose pay programs received negative say-on-pay recommendations by proxy advisory firms. Rather than counting on shareholder loyalty, management
at some such companies engaged with shareholders following an
"against" recommendation. As one report observed, "[w]ith addi195

196

Miller & Assayag, supra note 159, at 2.
Id. The Conference Board found that changes to non-performance-based pay fo-

cused on elimination for excise tax gross-ups (at 40 companies, both existing and future
pay packages), reduction or elimination of such executive perquisites as country club
memberships and financial planning (10 companies), and reduction of severance multiples from 3x to 2x cash compensation (3 companies). Id.
Id. Six companies in 2011 increased their guidelines on CEO stock ownership to
197
specify a range of 6x to lox salary, rather than the more common 5x salary. Id.
198 Id. Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to adopt enhanced "clawback" standards. Id. In
anticipation of these changes, companies changed their clawback provisions, expanding
the list of executives subject to clawback and broadening the items subject to clawbacks for
more company executives. Id.
199 Id. For example, some companies included a comparison TSR and CEO pay at the
beginning of the CD&A, anticipating this requirement under new SEC rules. Other companies included in the CD&A comparisons of company TSR with composite TSRs for peers
or a benchmark index-something already required under Form 10-K. Id. at 3.
200
Id. at 5.
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tional pressure from proxy-advisory firm recommendations, the new
law has led many companies to increase their communication with
shareholders and re-evaluate their compensation and corporate-gov20 1
ernance practices."
Some companies filed supplemental proxy disclosures following a
negative recommendation-including slideshow presentations, letters
to proxy advisory firms taking issue with information or analysis in
their reports, and letters to shareholders defending their pay-for-performance orientation. 20 2 Engagement with shareholders bore fruit.
Companies that responded to an ISS "against" recommendation with
additional disclosure eventually received a favorable say-on-pay vote.
Nonetheless, many companies receiving a negative say-on-pay recommendation were unprepared to quickly ramp up their shareholder
outreach. 20 3 Such companies have been advised to "hone their messaging and outreach strategy well in advance of next year's annual
20 4
meeting."
3.

Management Response to Say-on-Pay Rebukes

Management at many companies also seems to be responding
more to say-on-pay rebukes. For example, two companies that voluntarily put say on pay on the ballot in 2010 and received majority opposition-Occidental Petroleum and KeyCorp-changed their pay
practices. 20 5 As a result, shareholders gave significant support to the
revised pay packages at these firms-with votes of 91.3% and 86.7%
support, respectively, in 2011.206

Some companies with failed say-on-pay votes in 2011, however,
have chosen not to change their pay practices, but instead to blame
the proxy advisory firms. 20 7 Time will tell how well this strategy works.
201
152.

An Analysis of Voting Results and Performance at Russell 3000 Companies, supra note

202

See Miller & Assayag, supra note 159, at 3 (reporting such action at seven companies

among the first 100 to file proxy materials in 2011, all of which eventually received a
favorable say-on-pay vote); Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 6.
203
Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 6 (noting that such companies
failed to analyze shareholder demographics, develop an outreach strategy, and send a clear
message).
204 See id.
205 See ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 5. At Occidental, the company cut
CEO long-term incentive opportunities by 70%, expanded peer benchmarks, and reduced
award opportunities for other executives. Id. This was apparently also the case for the 1%
of companies under the TARP program that had a failed say-on-pay vote in 2010. See Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 7.
206
ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra notel52, at 5.
207

See Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 7.
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4. Fewer Votes Against DirectorReelection
According to ISS, say on pay may have changed the nature of the
shareholder-management dialogue, with shareholders resorting less
often in 2011 to "no" or "withhold" votes on directors sitting on compensation committees with controversial pay practices.2 08 That is, instead of expressing displeasure with executive pay by voting against
particular directors, the say-on-pay vote allows shareholders to speak
directly about the pay practices themselves.
The evidence in support of these claims is that the 2011 proxy
season saw directors reelected with the highest average support in the
past five years. 20 9 While 87 directors failed to receive majority support
in 2010, and 89 directors in 2009, the number of directors failing to
receive such support dropped to 43 in 2011.210 And instead of membership on a controversial compensation committee, other reasons
dominated for why these directors failed to receive majority support,
such as poor attendance at meetings, failure to put a poison pill to a
shareholder vote, and failure to act on majority-supported share21
holder resolutions. '
Nonetheless, shareholder dissatisfaction with directors on the
compensation committees at companies with failed say-on-pay votes
was relatively high. Such directors received on average 13.5% fewer
votes than other directors on the ballot. 212 This compared to only

2.4% fewer votes for compensation-committee directors at companies
that received a negative ISS recommendation, but had a passing say2 13
on-pay vote.
This may put pressure on compensation committee members at
companies with failed say-on-pay votes. ISS has indicated it may recommend against reelection of such members if the company has not
21 4
addressed the ISS say-on-pay concerns.

208
See ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 14-15. This pattern was in line with
ISS voting guidelines for 2011, which called on shareholders to vote to express dissatisfaction with controversial pay practices by voting against management's say-on-pay proposal,
"rather than withholding or voting against the compensation committee." But when man-

agement did not offer a say-on-pay proposal, ISS suggested that a "negative vote will apply
to members of the compensation committee." ISS 2011 GUIDELINES, supra note 186, at 37.
209
Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 5 (crediting data attributed to
ISS).
210
211

ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 14.
See id.

212

Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 5.
See id. (comparing, among companies receiving a negative ISS recommendation,
those with failed say-on-pay votes and those with passing say-on-pay votes).
213

214

See id.
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Lawsuits at Companies with Failed Say-on-Pay Votes

Although Dodd-Frank specifically disclaimed creating any new or
2 15
enhanced director fiduciary duties arising from say-on-pay votes,
negative "say on votes" have led to shareholder suits-as some predicted. Of the 37 firms with a negative say-on-pay vote in 2011, eight
have been subject to lawsuits alleging breaches of director fiduciary
duties and corporate waste. 216 Nonetheless, the proportion of firms
sued after a negative say-on-pay vote is lower than that for 2010, when
two of the three negative say-on-pay votes resulted in derivative
2 17
actions.
The actions generally claim that increases in executive pay were
at odds with the firm's stated pay-for-performance philosophy and
that the directors violated their fiduciary duties by disregarding the
negative say-on-pay vote in failing to rescind the increased executive
pay. 21 8 Despite predictions that the lawsuits would be denied as frivolous, and some dismissals, at least one court has denied a motion to
dismiss2 59-leading to questions about the protection of the business
220
judgment rule in such cases.
215 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (adding new section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Section 14A states:
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-The shareholder vote referred to in subsec-

tions (a) and (b) shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer, and may not be construed(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of directors;
(2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer
or board of directors;
(3) to create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or
board of directors; or
(4) to restrict or limit the ability of shareholders to make proposals for
inclusion in proxy materials related to executive compensation.
Id.
216
See Bachelder, supra note 177 (reporting that "at least nine shareholder derivative
actions (two of them against a single corporation, Janus Capital Group) have been filed
based on negative shareholder say-on-pay votes in 2011"); see alsoJessica Lochmann Allen,
Michael Schultz & Steven Vazquez, The Impact of the 'Say-on-Pay' Vote on the CEO Evaluation
Process, 14 Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA) 120 (Oct. 3, 2011) (stating that demand letters
have been submitted at other companies, suggesting further litigation absent settlement).
217
See Bachelder, supra note 177 (stating that both 2010 cases are reportedly settled).
218
SeeAllen, Schultz & Vazquez, supra note 216 (reporting that some cases allege that
the negative shareholder vote itself rebuts the business judgment rule).
219
SeeNECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, No. 1:11-cv-451, 2011 WL 4383368, at *1, *4
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2011) (representing the first derivative suit against officers and directors of Cincinnati Bell); Allen, Schultz & Vazquez, supra note 216.
220
See Laura G. Thatcher, 'CincinnatiBell' and 'Beazer.-What Do These Opposite Say-on-Pay
Decisions Bode for the Future?, 9 Corp. Counsel Wkly. (BNA) 1251 (Oct. 21, 2011); Kenneth
B. Davis, Jr. & Keith L. Johnson, Say-On-Pay Lawsuits-Is This Time Different? (Univ. Wisc.
Law Sch. Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1182, 2012), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1972406; William Alan Nelson II, Ending the Silence: ShareholderDerivative
Suits and Amending the Dodd-FrankAct so "Say on Pay" Votes May Be Heard in the Boardroom, U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REv. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988544.
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Fear of litigation following a failed say-on-pay vote has led corporate advisers to recommend that firms change the CEO performance
evaluation process, thus positioning the company to avoid a negative
vote or to defend against such a lawsuit. 221 Directors have also been
advised to "be especially sensitive to the deliberative process leading
up to pay decisions and the way in which that process is
documented."

222

Not only have directors at companies with failed say-on-pay votes
been sued, but so too have the company's pay consultants for allegedly aiding and abetting the breaches of director duties as well as purportedly breaching their consulting agreements. 2 23 Thus, pay
consultants will have an even greater incentive to help their clients
avoid a negative say-on-pay vote, perhaps demanding higher consulting fees and indemnification clauses in future consulting agreements
224
with at-risk clients.

6. Preparationsfor 2012 Proxy Season
Companies and various voting advisors are already preparing for
the 2012 proxy season. 2 25 Some companies with failed say-on-pay
votes in 2011 have moved to address the concerns identified by shareholders. 226 But even companies that received strong say-on-pay support are said to be planning or considering changes in their pay227
setting process in preparation for the 2012 proxy season.
In particular, firms with low, though successful, say-on-pay votes
have been advised to focus more attention on their pay practices. For
example, ISS predicts that companies that in 2011 received more than
30% say-on-pay opposition can expect "greater attention" in 2012.228

According to the Conference Board, governance experts conclude
that "companies with less than 75 percent to 80 percent support for
their SOP proposals this year remain at risk in 2012."229
221
See Allen, Schultz & Vazquez, supra note 216.
222 Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 6.
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See Inaugural Say-on-Pay Proxy Season Brings Few Problemsfor Most Companies, Although
Many Planfor Changes for 2012, Towers Watson Survey Finds, TowERs WATSON (July 28, 2011)
[hereinafter Towers Watson Survey], http://www.towerswatson.com/united-states/press/
5080.
226

See, e.g., ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 5 (providing the following ex-

amples: Helix Energy Solutions, which added performance metrics to its cash bonus program, and Umpqua Holdings, which retroactively added performance conditions to
previously awarded restricted stock and stock options).
227 See Towers Watson Survey, supra note 225.
228

ISS PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 152, at 5.

Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 5 (describing the view of Francis
Byrd, head of Corporate Governance and Risk Advisor at Laurel Hill Advisory Group).
229
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Some directors may have heard this message. According to the
2011 Annual Corporate Director Survey released by PricewaterhouseCoopers, of 834 directors surveyed 72% said they would
reconsider executive pay plans even when the plan had received majority shareholder support. 230 In addition, 24% of board members
said they had increased board-level communications with proxy advi231
sory firms over the past year.
Corporate lawyers are advising their clients-both to avoid lawsuits and to better make their case with shareholders-to initiate formal measures for CEO evaluation based on performance in light of
232 Such
the company's current strategy, goals, and market position.
evaluation, if undertaken on a regular basis, "may strengthen the case
for a CEO compensation decision based on longer-term performance
despite a 'blip' in the company's performance." 2 33 Recognizing the
weight shareholders have placed on pay-for-performance, corporate
advisers have urged compensation committees to clearly articulate
and then adhere to a pay-for-performance philosophy, "focusing on
the ways in which strong performance is rewarded and weak perform234
ance can be penalized."
Likewise, corporate advisers have urged corporate managers "to
understand what will drive the voting recommendations of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and other proxy advisory firms,
which are followed by many institutional investors." 23 5 Among the ISS
voting principles mentioned is that companies should provide their
shareholders with "clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures"-23 6
particularly on their pay-for-performance philosophy and practices.
In a recent far-ranging memo by Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and
237
Katz, the law firm advises clients how to "Win the Say on Pay Vote."

Directed not only to companies that had low shareholder support for
230 See Annual CorporateDirectorSurvey 2011 Findings: Boards Respond to Stakeholder Concerns, PRIGEWATERHOUSECOOPERs 2, 4, http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2011annual_
corporate-directory-survey.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
231 See id. at 4.
See Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note 162, at 6-7 (advising clients on how
232
to prepare for say-on-pay votes and possible litigation arising from such votes).
Allen, Schultz & Vazquez, supra note 216 (mentioning "tone at the top"-where
233
management performance is regularly tracked and strong performance rewarded-and
developing evaluation criteria based on short-term financial metrics and long-term nonfinancial metrics, such as acquisition strategy or executive succession planning).
Id.
234
236

Id.
Id.

237

SeeJeremy L. Goldstein, How to Win the Say on Pay Vote, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.

235

GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 1, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/

2011/12/01/how-to-win-the-say-on-pay-vote (posting material based on a Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz memorandum by Jeremy L. Goldstein, Jeannemarie O'Brien & David E.
Kahan).
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their say-on-pay proposals, the memo urges companies that "passed
last year's vote with flying colors" to prepare for the upcoming proxy
238
season given changes in the ISS voting criteria on say on pay.

The Wachtell Lipton memo describes changes ISS has proposed
to its say-on-pay voting guidelines, including revisions to its peer
group analysis (reducing the number of comparable firms to more
closely track each company's market cap and revenues) and to its
measures of pay alignment with TSR performance (on a relative basis
over one- and three-year periods and an absolute basis looking at rates
of pay change).239 In anticipation of these changes, the memo outlines five steps that companies should take to "best position" themselves for the upcoming proxy season's say-on-pay votes: (1)
understand how companies' pay programs align with voting policies
of major shareholders and ISS; (2) consider revising pay programs
based on shareholder feedback, recognizing that one revision may necessitate others; (3) begin work on the CD&A disclosure and use an
executive summary, both emphasizing pay for performance; (4) consider opening lines of communications with shareholders, particularly
if shareholder support in 2011 had been weak; and (5) be prepared to
respond to ISS voting recommendation after the company issues its
proxy disclosure, including assembling a task force for that purpose
and taking the case directly to shareholders.
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The results of our empirical analysis of the pre-Dodd-Frank
shareholder-sponsored proposals on executive pay practices and management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals shed some light on how the
enactment of mandatory say on pay will affect shareholder voting and
corporate governance more generally. We find that pre-Dodd-Frank
precatory executive pay proposals submitted by shareholders under
Rule 14a-8, including shareholder proposals recommending company-by-company adoption of advisory say-on-pay votes, attracted some
shareholder support, but generally did not obtain majority approval. 240 Nonetheless, proposals requesting that shareholders approve certain pay practices (other than the overall pay levels) and sayon-pay proposals received the highest levels of support of shareholdersponsored proposals related to executive pay, suggesting shareholder
2 41
interest in having more input in the pay-setting process.
Management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals in the pre-DoddFrank period attracted much higher levels of support-more than
238
239
240

241

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
supra Part III.A.1.
supra Part III.A.2.

2012]

DODD-FRANK'S SAY ON PAY

1265

twice as high as the average for shareholder-sponsored proposals. 2 42
Based on this evidence, we projected that management-sponsored say
on pay after Dodd-Frank would be likely to attract high levels of shareholder support and that only a relatively small fraction of such proposals were likely to fail to attract majority support. In fact, this is what
24 3
happened in the 2011 proxy season.
Turning to the influence of an ISS "for" recommendation on executive pay matters, our data suggest that in the pre-Dodd-Frank period, this type of ISS voting recommendation increased shareholder
support by about 20% for most categories of executive-pay advisory
proposals. 244 This ISS effect seems to be consistently true for management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals, as well as most categories of
shareholder-sponsored proposals. However, once we take into account the differing recommendations issued by management and ISS,
the impact of a favorable ISS recommendation is much smaller for
management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals compared to shareholder-submitted say-on-pay proposals. This suggests that ISS may be
less influential than commonly thought on this type of proposal. We
expect that this trend is also likely to persist in the post-Dodd-Frank
period, and we plan to test for it once we obtain the voting data from
ISS for the 2011 proxy season.
Looking to the information that is available, we find that shareholders post-Dodd-Frank gave broad support to executive pay packages. While this suggests that the voting gesture mandated by law
might have been mostly empty, placement of the issue on the company's ballot may have changed the dynamics of the shareholder-management dialogue. Shareholder votes focused negative
attention on poorly performing firms with relatively high pay levels.
During the 2011 proxy season, even before the annual meeting at
which the shareholders would have their say on pay, management at a
number of companies either changed the company's pay practices in
response to the possibility of an unfavorable shareholder vote, or offered additional disclosure explaining pay practices that had come
onto the shareholder radar screens. 245 In short, the mandate for
widespread say-on-pay votes may have led shareholders to become
more attentive to pay issues and may have led management to become
more responsive to shareholder concerns.
Has Dodd-Frank provided a stronger tool for the expression of
shareholder views on executive pay at targeted firms and opened or
widened channels of communication between management and
242
243
244
245

See
See
See
See

id.
supra Part MA.1.
supra Part III.B.
supra Part IV.B.1-3.
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shareholders on the issue? There is already anecdotal evidence for
this. During this past proxy season, management facing ISS recommendations against their say-on-pay proposals mounted informational
campaigns disputing ISS findings or seeking to explain their pay structures to institutional shareholders. 246 Further, management at companies with high executive pay and relatively weak stock price
performance may want to spend more time explaining their pay practices to their shareholders. We look forward to exploring these issues
further in our future research.

246 See Barrall & Chung, supra note 183, at 6; Littenberg, Damania & Neidig, supra note
162, at 6.

